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FOREWORD
This final report of the first phase of the Space Transfer Vehicle
(STV) Concept and Requirements Study was prepared by Boeing for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center in accordance with Contract NAS8-
37855. The study was conducted under the direction of the NASA
Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR), Mr Donald
Saxton from August 1989 to November 1990, and Ms Cynthia Frost
from December 1990 to April 1991.
This final report is organized into the following seven documents"
Volume I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Volume II FINAL REPORT
Book 1 - STV Concept Definition and Evaluation
Book 2 - System & Program Requirements Trade Studies
Book 3 - STV System Interfaces
Book 4 - Integrated Advanced Technology Development
Volume III PROGRAM COSTS ESTIMATES
Book 1 Program Cost Estimates (DR-6)
Book 2 WBS and Dictionary (DR-5)
The following appendices were delivered to the MSFC COTR and
contain the raw data and notes generated over the course of the
study:
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
90 day "Skunkworks" Study Support
Architecture Study Mission Scenarios
Interface Operations Flows
Phase C/D & Aerobrake Tech. Schedule Networks
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This section provides a description of the study in terms of background, objectives,
and issues. Use of trade names, names of manufacturers, or recommendations in
this report does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or
implied, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
NASA is currently studying new initiatives of space exploration involving both
piloted and unpiloted missions to destinations throughout the solar system. Many
of these missions require substantial improvements in launch vehicle and upper
stage capabilities. This study provides a focused examination of the Space
Transfer Vehicles (STV) required to perform these missions using the emerging
national launch vehicle definition, Space Station Freedom (SSF) definition, and
the latest mission scenario requirements.,
The study objectives are to define preferred STV concepts capable of
accommodating future exploration missions in a cost-effective manner, determine
the technology development (if any) required to perform these missions, and
develop a decision database of various programmatic approaches for the
development of the S'IV family of vehicles.
Special emphasis was given to examining space basing (stationing reusable
vehicles at a space station), examining the piloted lunar mission as a primary
design mission, and restricting trade studies to the high-performance, near-term
cryogenics (LO2/LH2) as vehicle propellant.
The study progressed through three distinct 6-month phases. The first phase
concentrated on supporting a NASA 3 month definition of exploration
requirements (the "90-day study") and during this phase developed and optimized
the space-based point-of-departure (POD) 2.5-stage lunar vehicle. The second
phase developed a broad decision database of 95 different vehicle options and
transportation architectures. The final phase chose the three most cost-effective
architectures and developed point designs to carry to the end of the study. These
reference vehicle designs (two are illustrated in figures 1.0-1 & 1.0-2) are mutually
exclusive and correspond to different national choices about launch vehicles and
in-space reusability. There is, however, potential for evolution between concepts.
1
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Figure 1.0-1. Highly Reusable Space-Based Lunar Vehicle
Offioading Lunar Payload
,,j
Figure 1.0-2. Ground-Based Lunar Vehicle Reuses Only
the Crew Module
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2.0 SUMMARY OF KEY
RECOMMENDATIONS
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
The study addressed a range of ques¼ions from very general (Why does the
country need a transfer vehicle?), to subsystem specific (For what specific
impulse should the engine be designed?). The key findings and conclusions
from these questions are presented in the following sections.
2.1 KEY FINDINGS
Why and when do we need an STV? NASA needs an completely new
upper stage to perfo .rrn the next piloted mission, whether that be a lunar landing,
an Earth orbit transfer to recover sample spacecraft, or a Mars transfer. Existing
upper stage systems do not have the reliability/redundancy, design process, or
performance capability to be a man-rated upper stage. In addition to NASA's
next piloted mission, other high-energy national missions need to be performed
that an STV could perform, rather than redesigning and significantly growing
existing stages to accomplish those missions.
The time frame for the piloted missions are driven by national goals and
priorities. Recent support for "mission to planet Earth" by the President and the
Augustine committee indicates that a lunar mission could be launched by 2005
if the transfer vehicle was ready. Other national high-energy missions that
occur before that date could use the vehicle in an unpiloted, protoflight mode.
The Civil Needs Data Base (CNDB) is a collection of all these potential S'IV
missions.
What are the missions that need an STV? The STV mission
requirements fall into three main categories: unpiloted delivery, piloted or
unpiloted servicing, and piloted or unpiloted lunar outpost support. The
performance energy required for these three mission categories are shown in
figure 2.1-1.
Unpiloted delivery missions are the shortest duration missions and require only
two or three main propulsion system burns a few hours apart to place the
3
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payload in the final orbit. Most of these missions are to various Earth orbits
(e.g., GEO and molynia) or to planetary boost trajectories.
Servicing missions require the vehicle to match orbits, rendezvous, and dock
with a platform or spacecraft in LEO polar, GEO, or high-energy parking orbit. A
high-value front end is carried round trip by the STV for these missions;
sometimes being a piloted crew cab with arms or simply a telerobotic servicer
with end effectors, spare parts, and consumables. In some cases the spacecraft
contains samples that must be returned to Earth. These missions require a
duration of 1 to 5 days and may involve significant teleoperation from the
ground, in addition to the precise docking capability.
The lunar outpost support missions have the most demanding requirements in
terms of duration, propulsive energy, and reliability/redundancy. The mission
requirements call for operation in two modes: piloted reusable (transport crew
4
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and limited cargo from LEO to the lunar outpost and return the crew) and cargo
expendable (transport cargo from LEO to the lunar outpost where the empty
vehicle remains). The vehicle must be man rated, and the requirements specify
two failure tolerance during all mission phases.
What should the space transfer vehicle look like? This study examined
a wide variety of different staging concepts, launch vehicles, engines, crew
modules, trajectory options, and technology levels. The goal was not to
recommend one "best" vehicle, but to develop a decision database for a variety
of infrastructure and technology conditions. This phase of the study did result in
three "reference vehicle concepts" chosen which correspond to different
national infrastructure requirements as described below.
Figures 2.1-2, 2.1-3, and 2.1-4 show the Earth-to-orbit (ETO) launcher
requirements for the three vehicle concepts. The launch vehicle, more than any
other factor, strongly affects the configuration of the concepts. The three
concepts were developed expressly to optimally use the three ranges of launch
vehicle capability under consideration by NASA and the Air Force. The space-
based concept shown in Figure 2.1-2 provides the capability to mount a very
large mission to the Moon with a very modest ETO launch capability. The lunar
transfer vehicle is assembled at the Space Station from elements launched in
shuttle and shuttle-derived type launch vehicles. Transfer stage reusability and
other benefits of space basing are emphasized, and the crew module and most
of the stage remain at the Space Station between flights.
The ground-based concept shown in Figure 2.1-3 is similar to the concept
Apollo used to launch to the Moon. A single very large (twice the size of Saturn
V) ETO launcher boosts the vehicle directly into an Earth phasing orbit for the
translunar injection burn. This very large launcher, like Saturn V before it,
would be developed solely to perform the lunar and later Mars missions. The
range of ETO payloads represented by these two concepts spans from 70
(metric) tons for space-based concept to 225 tons of launcher capacity for the
ground-based concept. The third concept, which fall between these two
concepts, is a ground-based Earth orbit rendezvous (EOR) concept that
requires a launch vehicle with about 120 tons of capacity (Figure 2.1-4). The
transfer vehicle in this case is similar to the ground-based case, except the
5
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Figure 2.1.3. Ground-Based Launch Concept
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Figure 2.1.4. Ground-Based Multilaunch ETO Concept
oxygen propellant is offloaded and boosted to orbit on an earlier flight to reduce
launcher requirements. No on-orbit integration of flight elements is required in
the EOR concept. Only rendezvous and docking with the oxygen tanker is
required, as shown in Figure 2.1-5.
Figure 2.1.5. Ground.Based Vehicle Docking With Oxygen
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Figure 2.1-6 shows the major components and features of the space-based
reference concept, and Figure 2.1-7 shows the common features of the two
ground-based reference concepts. The ground-based concepts are similar at
this configuration level; the only difference is that the oxygen tanks are
launched empty in the multilaunch concept, which requires an orbital tanker.
A common denominator throughout the study was the mission model; the study
did not depart from the civil needs database (CNDB) FY'89 and the lunar
option 5 of the NASA 90-day study. (Sensitivity to different flight frequency and
varying payload size will be examined in the next phase of this study). A
second common denominator was the use of a consistent set of trade study
criteria used for all architecture analyses: cost, margins & risk, non lunar
mission capture and benefits to the Mars Program. These evaluation criteria
are discussed in additional detail in section 3.2.
TLI drop_
tanks "X_
Descent /
Cargo X
tanks (2) volume (2)
Featu res
• 50 ft dla aerobrake
• Largest element 65 mt
(TL! tankset)
• Reentry L/D >.2
• Asymmetric vehicle
(offset crew module)
• Launchable in 30 ft
shroud
• 15 ftx oocargo envelope
(expendable missions)
• Recovery to SSF
• Reuse all high value
elements
• Crew module fits in
Shuttle cargo bay
• Self unloadable
Figure 2.1-6. Space-Based Vehicle Concept
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Figure 2.1-7. Ground-Based Vehicle Concept
Can a single vehicle "family" satisfy the STV requirements? Yes,
elements of a single vehicle designed for the lunar mission can satisfy the
propulsive requirements of all potential missions in the database except for the
piloted Mars transfer. (Mars transfer requires an order of magnitude higher
propulsive energy, and two to four times longer mission duration. Mars ascent
and earth reentry vehicles, however, could strongly utilize lunar systems.)
An example of vehicle elements "capturing" these mission classes is shown in
Figure 2.1-8, where the ground-based vehicle is broken into main elements.
Corresponding performance for the booster strap-on and the complete vehicle
is shown in relation to the mission performance requirements. The booster
propellant load allows it to capture all the delivery missions and about half of
the servicing missions. The complete vehicle captures the remaining servicing
missions and the lunar missions. Thus, the booster strap-on developed for
lunar orbit insertion and lunar landing can be used as a standalone element
(with the addition of the avionics/RCS pallet) to capture more than half the
missions in the CNDB mission model.
9
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Why don't we do the lunar mission like Apollo? The Apollo program
goals and objectives are significantly different than the S'T'V goals. President
Kennedy stated Apollo's goal when he said, "...to land a man on the Moon and
return him safely; and do it within this decade." The S'iV goal, which is much
more operationally oriented, is "to provide a cost-effective transportation system
capable of supporting an exploration program resulting in a manned outpost on
the Moon." The mission requirements comparison between Apollo and STV in
Figure 2.1-9 also show wide differences. The S'IV payload is larger by a factor
of between twenty to fifty, surface duration is increased by two orders of
magnitude, and subsystem component failure tolerance has increased for some
systems.
The Apollo program consisted of a three-stage launch vehicle and a three-stage
transfer vehicle (stage 3 (SIVB) could be called either). Apollo had a crash
program schedule which attempted to land a crew and small payload on the
Moon with as short a developmenttime as possible. To meet the important
schedule requirements the program utilized launch vehicle (C-series) & engine
(F-l, J-2) development programs already underway, and operated without an
orbital infrastructure (i.e., space stations) that could have been used for
assembly - which put distinct performance limitations on the design. The Apollo
lO
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Crew on Lunar surface
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Duration on lunar surface
Cargo mass to LS
Cargo returned to earth
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Apollo STV
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3 days max 190-360 days
0.7 tonnes 13/32 tonnes
0.2 t 0.5 t
0* 2 failed and rtn
-=
* LEM ascent burn and CSM TEl bum
Duration, cargo mass delivered, and MPS failure tolerance ]_
Figure 2.1-9. ApolIo-STV Requirements Comparison
design was thus schedule and performance optimized, with less regard to
program cost.
The S'I'V design was cost and margins and risk optimized, which resulted in a
reduced number of stages and eliminated splitting up the Earth return vehicle
into a lander and a lunar orbiter. Both of these design decisions reduce cost,
but increase the propellant required to fly the mission. It was determined that
launching the extra propellant is cheaper than designing the vehicle to fly like
Apollo; even when the propellant requirements are almost twice as high.
The S'IV is an all cryogenic vehicle, like the space shuttle. Apollo used storable
MMH/NTO for the descent and ascent engines. Cryogenic fluid management
was not as well understood as it is today and was not used for landing because
of uncertainty in system reliability and boiioff on the lunar surface. The STV
uses a high-performance cryogenic engine (ASE or RL10) and includes in the
development program sufficient testing to demonstrate required reliability of
engines and insulation. The vehicle additionally carries extra engines to
provide sufficient margin in the case of engine failures.
How sensitive are the designs to changes in the mission
requirements? Any design (including these specific vehicle designs) is quite
sensitive to mission requirements changes if these changes affect the basic
11
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selection criteria. Key mission requirements that are very design sensitive
include payload mass, the program goal to be cost effective (i.e., cost is a
selection criteria), and the redundancy requirement for all life critical systems
(two failure tolerance). Significant changes in these three factors would cause
significant changes in the design and operations of the vehicle.
For example, the lunar vehicle has six 15-20k Ibf engines, four are optimum
considering the gravity loss curve for the most important first burn. In addition, a
conservative reading of the two failure tolerance requirement requires the ability
to land on the Moon (abort to surface rule) after two engines have failed.
Starting with at least six engines allows the vehicle to land safely with two
engines out; the two opposing engines are shut down and the two remaining
engines allow vehicle center-of-gravity capture and vertical attitude touchdown.
(The large landing mass of the reference concepts (126,000 to 198,000 Ib) als 9
requires the thrust of a minimum of two engines just to hover.) The abort to
surface rule was chosen on a cost minimum basis because of the high-value
payload and the once-yearly flight. One very large engine could have been the
answer, if cost and redundancy were not included in the selection criteria. If the
operational flight rule was made to never land with more than one engine out, a
four-engine vehicle would be optimum.
Other mission requirement changes would have less of an effect on the vehicle
system. Changes in duration or crew number would change the size slightly. A
viewing requirement to observe the two front landing pads and the horizon
simultaneously definitely restricts the landing configuration. The launch escape
requirement necessitates the crew module location atop the stack in the launch
vehicle shroud; there are a series of requirements that could change the system
design slightly if they were modified. Mission requirements are discussed in
detail in Volume II, Book 2, and concept response to those requirements are
contained in Volume II, Book 1.
How sensitive are the designs to changes in the launch vehicle?
The launch vehicle selection is critical to the transfer vehicle program. During
the study it was recognized that the existing launch vehicles (STS and Titan IV)
were not large enough or economic enough to support a major new initiative
such as a lunar outpost. It is a fact that a new launch vehicle of some kind
12
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(larger and more economic) would be required. The s'rv designs presented
above provide for any of three major classes of vehicles being available: (1) a
vehicle launching 40 to 71 tons, with a payload envelope at least 15 to 30 feet
in diameter; (2) a heavy lift vehicle capable of launching 120 tons, with an
envelope 45 feet in diameter; and (3) a very heavy lift vehicle, which will
probably only be used for lunar and Mars support, capable of launching 225
tons, with an envelope 45 feet in diameter.
Fundamentally, if the launch vehicle decreases in capability one of three things
must happen: either the mission payload decreases, the transfer vehicle is
broken into increasingly smaller pieces and assembled in orbit, or the mission
design or propulsion technology is changed to give greater value to higher
performance at the "expense" of making the program cost more. As to the first
result, throughout the study payload to the lunar Surface was held constant and
not compromised. (Future studies will examine the effect of decreased payload
in the early phases of the lunar program.) The three concepts required varying
amounts of on-orbit assembly; the largest booster system requiring none to the
space-based concept requiring five launches before the first flight was fully
assembled.
Having a fixed launch vehicle with a "not to exceed" payload capability would
change the nature of the study from a clean sheet design to a performance
constrained design, which would probably affect some subsystem technology
choices and would certainly result in a higher cost program. The magnitude of
increased costs in a performance constrained case will be examined in the next
study phase.
How sensitive are the designs to changes in the space base
Infrastructure? Changes in the space base could affect that vehicle's design,
but only slightly. The vehicle is already designed to be as autonomous as
possible. The aerobrake is designed to be deployable and therefore not
requiring EVA astronauts to assemble or verify connections. The drop tanks
and core stage are ,designed to be assembled using a remote manipulator
(potentially ground controlled) and checkout is performed by onboard systems
(this checkout must be clone again after 6 months in lunar orbit or on the Moon,
so it must be an onboard function).
13
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The Space Station could still change significantly without requiring much
change in the transfer vehicle. Some node is required in the space based
design to provide 1) a stable structure on which to base vehicle assembly,
integration and fueling, 2) provisions for crew ingress and final checkout, 3i a
meteoroid/debris-free Storage environment, and 4) hardware required for
repair refurbish operations. Figure 2.1-10 shows a variety of node options and
operational capabilities. Vehicle interface requirements are discussed in detail
in Volume II, Book 3, and the node accommodations to those requirements are
contained in Volume II, Book 1.
What type of propulsion system is most desirable for a new STV?
One of the ground rules of the STV statement of work was that "only cryogenic
LOX/LH STV concepts will be considered." Within that ground rule two general
aiterpatives presented themselves: a derivative of the Pratt & Whitney RL10
engine or the advanced space engine (ASE), which is a new engine under
study by the NASA-Lewis Research Center (LeRC). The RL10 was developed
30 years ago and continues to be used on all the Centaur derivatives. The
engine was considered for lunar excursion module (LEM) propulsion in the
1960's when a cryogenic LEM was still under study and significant throttling
tests proved the engine could be modified to perform the landing mission. The
Establish Node +
• Thrusters
• Avionics
& S/W
• Power
Fuel Transfer
With Tanker + Vehicle Reusability+
• Larger RCS
• Increased Power
Docking FixturesCryo Plumbing
Core / Tanker
Interface umbilical
Vehicle Repair
• Increased Power •Increased Power
• Thermal Control .Increased Avionics
• Debris & S/W
Protection .Fine resolution
• Large element manipulation
manipulation •Storage for ORUs
I The LEO transportation node could have a wide range of complexity I
Figure 2.1.10. Varying LEO Node Requirements
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ASE is a clean sheet design that is currently in a brassboard testbed stage.
This engine is being designed for space maintenance and throttleability. The
ASE would be smaller, more efficient (higher Isp), and lighter weight than the
RL10, but cost more ($1 billion and more than 3 years) in development.
The ASE was chosen for the lunar transfer vehicle design because it provided
the lowest life cycle cost over the life of the program, and the size permitted
better integration of the six engines required to meet the strict redundancy
requirement interpretation. If this requirement is relaxed or reinterpreted, if
launched mass is not a constraint, or if front-end funding is more important than
lowest life cycle cost then the RLIO engine would be a fine choice for the main
engine.
:.,_j
What is the value and role of aeroassist to the. program? In the
broadest sense, both ground- and space-based concepts use aeroassist
systems in the final velocity change maneuver. Like Apollo and the shuttle, the
ground-based concepts use a heat shield and the Earth's atmosphere to slow
down to terminal descent speeds for an Earth landing. • The type of thermal
protection system (TPS) chosen (from single use ablators to transpiration
cooled ceramics) is a function of aerodynamic characteristics, development cost
and turnaround requirements. All concepts that reenter to the Earth's surface
must use the atmosphere to slow down.
The real trade of whether or not to use the Earth's atmosphere to slow down
comes in the space-based concept. The choices are between carrying the
additional propellant to perform one more burn in low Earth orbit (LEO) with the
same engines used for the other 3 to 5 mission burns or to carry an aerobrake
(Figure 2.1-11), which is a TPS covered structure that transfers the air loads and
shields the rest of the vehicle from the high temperatures of the aeromaneuver.
The aerobrake, therefore, is one more element of the main propulsion system
and must be evaluated on its propulsive efficiency.
Previous studies have examined various types of aeroassist devices, from
lightweight inflatable ballutes, to fabric-covered deployable umbrella
aerobrakes, to rigid tile covered shells. Early in this study, during the 90-day
15
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Figure 2.1-11. Aeromaneuver In Earth's Upper Atmosphere
exercise, the MSFC inhouse team chose the dgid shell as the aeroassist device
of choice. The shell is the lowest risk design because it has the best
understood structural and TPS concepts, with test plans already in place (the
aeroassist flight experiment (AFE) will test this concept in the mid-1990's).
While the rigid shell provides a lower risk development and operation for piloted
missions, it is the most massive of the three aeroassist device choices
mentioned above and thus the least competitive from a performance standpoint.
When comparing even this heaviest of aerobrake designs with either all-
propulsive options, the aerobrake will win the life cycle cost analysis. This
means it saves more money in reduced propellant boosting costs than it did to
develop and test, and it saves at a greater rate than either engine option. If the
choice was made on life cycle cost alone, the aerobrake would beat the all-
propulsive options. However, as described earlier, there were four evaluation
criteria to score options against: cost (development and life cycle), margins and
risk, other mission capture, and benefits to the Mars program. The aerobrake
wins in the life cycle cost and benefits to Mars categories, loses in the
development cost and margins and risk categories, and provides no additional
mission capture benefits. Thus, depending on how these criteria are weighted
and what it costs to boost propellant to orbit, either aerobraking or all-propulsive
options could be the best answer. Figures 2.1-12 and 2.1-13 show the effect of
16
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changing the weighting mix of evaluation criteria for low boost cost and high
boost cost, respectively. As expected, when the cost score is emphasized
aerobraking has the lowest score (wins); and when launch vehicle boost costs
are higher, aerobraking wins more often. (This same relationship is seen just
as strongly with an increasing Mars benefit score; for more trade study data see
Volume II, Book 2, System Architecture Study.)
Should the STV be based on the ground, in space, or use both
modes? There are two main reasons for establishing, a transportation node in
LEO: to decouple the transfer vehicle mission from the launch vehicle capacity
and to enable reuse of more transfer vehicle components than can be
economically reentered to the Earth's surface. Regarding the first reason, this
study has shown that a space base is advisable if launch vehicle capacity is
limited to 70 tons and the cargo delivered to the Moon is greater than 30 to 40
tons per mission. However, if a larger launch vehicle exists or the cargo can be
taken in smaller elements, then a LEO node is not absolutely required.
Space basing may, however, still be advisable if the lunar missions are frequent
enough to make core stage reuse more cost effective. At less than one
reusable flight per year, even the ground-based plan of recovering only the
crew module requires a new module only every 5 to 10 years. Building a new
stage every 5 years is not very cost effective, and building the entire fleet plus
extensive stores at one time entails programmatic risks.
The next phase of this study will examine other lunar cargo capacities and
mission frequencies. Use of the lunar vehicle core for non-lunar servicing
missions showed promise for space-based concepts when those servicing
missions were in the mission model. The latest edition of the civil needs
database (CNDB '90) removes all servicing missions that could have used the
lunar transfer vehicle core stage.
In summary, a space-based concept is required if the lunar mission definition
remains a single large flight once per year and the largest launch vehicle
capacity is in the 70-ton range. If either of these conditions changes, space
basing may still win economically if there are sufficient missions to support
vehicle reusability.
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How cost effective is stage reusability for the space-based STV
missions? There are four major cost factors that must be examined to assess
the cost effectiveness of reusability: development costs, production costs,
launch costs, and refurbishment costs. In-space reusability strives to reduce
production and launch costs, but must endure slightly higher development costs
(design for reuse) and incurs a refurbish cost that single-use systems do not.
We would expect that reusability is more attractive when Earth-to-orbit launch
costs are more expensive.
In reality, reusability of the lunar transfer vehicle elements do not save
significant production costs at the current mission model rate for reasons
discussed in the previous question. For even a modest number of four reuses,
the mission model rate of around one flight per year requires production of a
vehicle only once every 5 to 6 years, which is a very inefficient method of
maintaining manufacturing capability. Alternately, building the six vehicles and
spares required over the 30-year program life would mean using the equivalent
of a 25 year old mothballed Gemini capsule for orbit or reentry operations today.
Using hardware whose production line shut down 25 years before would be too
great a risk to be a realistic option. (However, given a continued production
demand, a system such as Atlas Centaur with decades old design and
technology can still remain a viable program.) So, the main factors to be
examined in the reusability trade for the reference mission, is launch costs
versus refurbish costs.
Launch costs of a space-based reusable lunar transfer vehicle are indeed lower
than an equivalent single-use system. (This is not true for pure payload delivery
missions, as there is no reuse.) The core stage (and aerobrake) only need to be
launched from Earth every 5 to 6 years. An example of this delta launch cost is
shown in Figure 2.1-14, with the first time or expendable "ETO" launch costing
$102 million (9%) more than the reusable case ($1,237M -$1,135M). For the
reusable case, additional flights are required to launch orbital support
hardware, such as vehicle debris protection enclosures and additional space-
based reboost propellant, but the net balance is in favor of the reusable system
on a launched mass basis over the life of the program.
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Figure 2.1-14. O&S Flight Cost Buildup - SB2-1.5S
The refurbish cost of a reusable, space-based system includes two major
elements: facilitization and operations. All space-based concepts require some
assembly on orbit, which requires facilities such as debris protection, assembly
fixtures, and remote manipulation systems. The additional facilities required for
"turnaround operations" to refurbish used equipment for reflight may not be
significant depending on the design philosophy established. In the built-in
redundancy or even the "remove and replace LRU" philosophy there is very
little extra equipment required for refurbish operations over what would
normally be required of on-orbit test and checkout after spacecraft assembly.
The extra operations Is the main cost element. The study has estimated
turnaround (refurbishment) operations at 864 labor-hours, which would cost
$133 million. The crew module requires the most refurbishment between flights
(done IVA), and for reusable systems these operations are performed
(expensively) on orbit by a few astronauts, instead of on the ground by
numerous technicians.
=
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As Figure 2.1-14 shows, two major cost elements affecting reusability (launch
costs and on-orbit operations and support costs) essentially cancel one
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another. If production costs are removed as an issue because of the very low
flight rate, there is no cost advantage or disadvantage to reusing space-based
vehicles.
What kind of program schedule is appropriate? The current mission
model calls for lunar missions and other delivery and servicing missions to
begin in the same year. With this mission model there is no opportunity for
vehicle "evolution" or phased development of various vehicle elements (i.e.,
developing the booster first and using it as a protoflight testbed before lunar
flights commence). The development program is shown in Figure 2.1-15.
Note the risk reducing technology development effort starting early in the
program with cryogenic fluid management, propulsion, and aerobraking
"national test beds". Other program options are being examined in a future
phase of this study that either have no other missions to capture besides the
lunar mission (other Air Force or NASA vehicles are developed for the other
missions) or the lunar mission is accomplished gradually, slowly increasing the
amount of cargo to the lunar surface or gradually increasing the functionality of
the vehicle from purely unpiloted to piloted over several years.
Does this program minimize development costs? Minimizing
development and life cycle costs was given high priority in the trade studies.
Final vehicle concepts were selected because they reduce these costs, while
achieving other overall objectives, such as developing technology and
infrastructure for eventual Mars programs. However, if the vehicles had been
designed with only front-end funding minimization as the sole cdteda, the new
advance space engine (ASE) and aerobraking would have been delayed or
eliminated.
The ASE provides greater performance (Isp) and lighter weight and can be
designed for space-based maintenance. However, the engine will cost $1
billion more in development than modifying the existing cryogenic engine (the
RL10). If launch vehicle size restrictions require the greater performance (ASE
provides for 5% to 9% lower initial mass in low Earth orbit (IMLEO) than the
RL10), then the ASE would be required to boost the annual 41 tons of cargo to
the lunar surface. Most likely the cargo capacity would be lowered at the outset
and improved when the ASE eventually replaced the RL10 engine. If the
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vehicle is to be space based, then either the RL10 would require additional
modifications to the vehicle interface to simplify remove and replace or an ASE
would be required with the "clean sheet" interface developed expressly for the
space-based design case. At this point in the STV program, without a firm
launch vehicle to pose performance restrictions, or a decision to definitely
space base the vehicle; the ASE simply provides a lower recurring cost (greater
performance) and is not required to perform the mission.
The aerobrake is one entire vehicle element that could be eliminated to reduce
front-end funding. The aerobrake pertains only to the space-based vehicle
concept and is assembled and maintained at the Space Station between flights.
The advantage of the aerobrake is that it eliminates the final Earth orbit burn
and thus reduces the amount of propellant and tankage needed to be carried.
During the trade studies, aerobraking won over "all propulsive" when examining
the program life cycle costs. Breakeven time (where the advantage in recurring
cost equalled the cost of development) varied between the first and fifth
missions when propellant boost to LEO varied from $6,000/kg to $1,000/kg,
respectively. This is a very quick and attractive payback, even for the "cheap
boost" case. Clearly however, when examining front-end costs, the aerobrake
is one additional element to develop and test. (The design, development, test,
and evaluation (DDT&E) difference between an aerobraked stage and an all-
propulsive stage is $0.5 to $1 billion.)
The aerobrake (like the ASE) is therefore a cost-enhancing element, not a
required element for the space-based lunar mission. The aerobrake is
required for the Mars mission scenarios, even in the nuclear thermal vehicle
when it is used only on the Mars lander, and will need to be developed for any
Mars program. The important questions are (1) how closely tied together will
the Mars and lunar programs be, (2) whether the lunar vehicle is space based,
and if so, and (3) whether recurring costs, not just development costs are
considered important in program selection.
These are two additional elements (the advanced space engine and the
aerobrake) that could be delayed or eliminated to reduce the development cost,
however at substantial penalty in overall life cycle costs. Even with these two
elements, the front end costs of the transfer system defined in the three
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reference concepts are significantly lower than equivalent year dollars for the
corresponding Apollo costs. Figure 2.1-16 shows the comparison between
Apollo (which was performance driven, and required significant technology
development) and the cost driven STV concepts.
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Figure 2.1-16. Comparison of Apollo Hardware DDT&E
to Boeing L TS Vehicle DDT&E Estimates
2.2 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
The launch vehicle is key to lunar transfer system design. The next
transfer vehicle will be designed to accomplish missions using whatever new
launch vehicle is developed. Decision on a launch vehicle should precede or
be done in concert with transfer vehicle design. Accordingly, as the nation
proceeds with new launcher development, the STV and lunar mission
requirements need to be accommodated in the new launcher. This study has
developed a data base where the lowest cost and risk options were identified
for three launch vehicle sizes. The data base provides insight into the
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sensitivity of the vehicle design to various launch vehicle factors, such as the
following:
• Launch vehicle boost cost affects staging location and vehicle design (Lunar
orbit rendezvous versus direct descent, for example).
• Launch vehicle shroud size and payload capability affects S'T'V stage design
and operations (drop tanks, inflight turn and redock maneuvers, top versus side
mount of vehicle elements)
• Launch vehicle operations affects S'I'V design and operations ("ship & shoot",
pad access, P/A module recovery with direct injection)
• Launch vehicle design for manrating affects S'FV mission operations & design
(launch escape systems versus separate crew launch)
• All above launch vehicle factors affects STV costs
Current technology, with cost enhancing updates in some areas, is
sufficient to return tothe moon. Some subsystem development in the
Reaction Control System (RCS), Thermal Protection System (TPS) and avionics
& software were shown to be cost effective, however the missions could still be
performed with less efficient alternate systems or operational scenarios. The
space based design requires the most advancement in technology, because of
the longer orbital lifetime and the additional on-orbit vehicle assembly, checkout
and refurbishment required. All concepts were designed to avoid requiring
major advancement in cryo fluid management (tank exchange and propulsive
settling are baselined for fluid transfer), however highly efficient cryo insulation
systems are required in all cases.
Either ground or space based concepts will work well, depending
on launch vehicle and mission requirements. Any of the three
reference concepts could perform the required mission. The choice between
ground and space basing can be made on the basis of other national decisions,
such as the launch vehicle capability and the lunar outpost payload sizes. For
the mission model and infrastructure costs used, the space based case had 10-
20% higher DDT&E and cost 20-25% more over the program life than the
ground based case. However, the space based case develops many of the
systems, technologies and operations that will eventually be required for a
space assembled Mars transfer system. If the Mars and Lunar missions are
tightly coupled in time, the space based cost differences may be less severe.
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2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
As stated above, the reference designs were derived for a fixed payload size
and mission model - with few other design constraints. With the latest civil
needs data base eliminating all manned mission but the lunar mission - future
study needs to concentrate on the "lunar mission" as the driving need for the
agency's next upper stage development. Additional study could provide
resolution as to the "best" design for this upper stage system:
• Examine alternate lunar outpost designs, varying flight frequency, payload
sizes, and unsupported lunar staytimes
• Fix launch vehicle size to that currently envisioned for other national
requirements and examine how "performance constraining" increases overall
system costs
• Examine the fundamental goals and all hardware elements of the lunar
program (i.e., payloads, lunar outpost, launch vehicle and transfer vehicle)
with various overall program cost ceilings and identify optimum cost
allocations and program schedules between the elements
• Examine options involving other programs, including common development
program with the Mars mission (storable propellants could be attractive
options for ascent vehicles), common earth re-entry vehicles (with ACRV/PLS
or Mars return vehicle), or evolution of some stages from an NLS (National
Launch System) upper stage.
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3.0 STUDY RESULTS
3.1 MISSION ANALYSES
Mission analysis activities consisted of the development of design reference
missions (DRM) with associated mission timelines and performance
requirements. In addition, trajectory programs were developed and analyses
conducted, pdmadly for the Earth/Moon trajectories.
3.1.2 MISSION MODEL ANALYSIS
3.1.2.1 Mission Model Overview
The missions developed for the STY Concepts and Requirements study were
taken from a number of different data sources (Figure 3.1-1). A detailed
discussion of the DRM development process, including individual DRM
requirements and design drivers, DRM selection rationale, mission timelines,
and discussions of the source databases is included in volume II, section 1-1.2.
S Dace Exploration I
Initiative(SEI) I
[OoOI I OtherMarsLunar Initiative O'-tion_ 51 customer Inputs IInitiative"
Reference
-___ _ Missions
Geosynchronous _ " R_gNI_ 1Version FY89 '
Planetary, etc - Modified (SRS)
- Augmented Set
• Regime 2- Luna_
• Regime 3 - Mar_
* Replaced by SE! models
Figure 3.1-1. STV Mission Model
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The top-level mission model was supplied at the beginning of the study (August
1989) and consisted of line items taken directly from the 1989 civil needs
database (CNDB). The CNDB-based model was further appended with a DoD
model supplied by MSFC. The MSFC mission model for STV Concepts and
Requirements studies was delivered with NASA HQ approval.
At about the same time as the creation of the STV mission model, a number of
scenarios were being developed in support of the Human Exploration Initiative
(HEI), which is now called the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). The lunar and
Mars port!ons of the CNDB were replaced by the SEI Option 5. SEI Option 5
eventually became Reference Approach E in NASA's 90-Day Study on Human
Exploration of the Moon and Mars. All of these sources, in addition to the
inputs from MSFC, were used to build a set of design reference missions for the
S'IV study.
The design reference missions (DRM) selected for the STV are listed in Figure
3.1-2. The DRMs are divided into two categories: primary and evolutionary
missions. The primary DRMs cover a range of lunar missions, both piloted and
cargo-expendable. The four lunar DRMs, L1 through L4, were intended to
provide sufficient detail to define vehicle and operational concepts for the STV.
The lunar DRMs were taken from Option 5 of the lunar Initiative and were based
on an informational data book written by NASA-JSC (Initial Study Period
Results Summary Planet Surface Systems - Conceptual Design and
Development Requirements) defining the mission manifest and planetary
surface systems to be taken as cargo by the STV. The lunar DRMs provided a
basis for vehicle designs that met the primary objective of the STV program; to
provide a transportation system capable of supporting a human exploration
program to the Moon.
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Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Lunar Cargo - LTV/LEV
Piloted Lunar-- LTV/LEV
piloted Lunar- Single
P/A Module
Lunar Cargo - Single
Launch.
Planetary Delivery
GEO Delivery
Molniya Deliver
Piloted GEO Servicing
LEO Polar Servicing
LEO Space Tug
Nuclear/Debris Disposal
Piloted Sample Return
Piloted Mars
De_ianator
L1
L2
L3
L4
P1
G1
D1
G2
$1
T1
N1
C1
M1
Figure 3.1-2 STV Design Reference Missions
Nine evolutionary design reference missions were selected in addition to the
lunar missions. These nine missions are split between those targeted for
backward and forward evolution. The initial missions required before the lunar
Initiative (2002) will be supported by an early version of the S'IV capable of
evolving to the Lunar Transportation System. Examples of these sorts of
missions Include planetary and molniya delivery. The non-lunar missions
required after LTS development will involve evolution from the lunar vehicle to a
growth vehicle (or vehicle based on LTS components) capable of supporting
the new mission requirements.
The goal in creating a set of design reference missions was to capture all of the
worst case requirements from the large quantity of missions included in the STV
mission model in a much smaller and manageable mission set. The design
reference missions are not necessarily identical to specific missions in the
model but, in some cases, are a mosaic composed of the driving elements of
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two or more missions from the model which envelope the requirements for that
class of missions..
The CNDB FY90 was released toward the end of the study activity. A brief
analysis of the new version of the database showed that all of the non-lunar and
Mars missions that drove STV requirements were eliminated. The only
traditional upper stage missions that remained in the CNDB FY90 were
geosynchronous and planetary delivery. Elimination of thesedriving missions
should allow a more graceful evolutionary path for the STV program. The
mission model used for the STY study required the majority of the total STV
capabilities to be available within a short time after initial flight.
3.1.3 TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS
The performance and trajectory analyses performed during the study can be
broken down into four categories: (1) creation of an Earth-to-Moon trajectory
database, (2) Development of the Lunar mission survey (LMS) program, (3)
Boeing Lunar Trajectory (BOLT) multiphase trajectory program development,
and (4) detailed analysis of specific performance and trajectory analysis issues.
The LMS uses data from the Earth-to-Moon database with the BOLT program
using data from the LMS program. With this process, comprehensive trajectory
information can be readily developed including: actual delta V requirements,
which include finite burn losses; trip times; Earth/Sun/Moon geometry for
communications and thermal design; injection windows with associated delta V
penalties for window extension; and pointing accuracies.
Copies of the database and program codes with descriptions and analysis
results, were provided to MSFC as completed in 1989 and 1990 in working
group and program review meetings. A summary of the four areas of work is
given in the following paragraphs with detailed discussions presented In
volume II, section 1-1.3.
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3.1.3.1 Earth-to-Moon Trajectory Database
Parametric data were generated summarizing 364 Earth-to-Moon trajectories
with initial ascending (south to north) motion at the Trans-lunar Insertion (TLI)
burn. The parameters varied are listed as follows.
Lunar true anomaly, deg
Transit time, hours
Translunar inclination, deg
J_ Interval (# of yalues!
0-360 30 (13)
48-120 12 (7)
0-60 20 (4)
The trajectories were generated by integration, including Moon and Earth
perturbations. Results, which completely define Earth-to-Moon (and by
symmetry, Moon-to-Earth) trajectories, are stored in four ASCII files of 91
trajectories each for automated lookup by programs such as the LMS program.
3.1.3.2 Lunar Mission Survey Program
The LMS program is an analytical tool for the preliminary mission planning
stage of lunar missions originating in, and returning to, low Earth orbit (LEO).
LMS provides a definition of timing and AV requirements for the impulses out of
LEO, into and out of low lunar orbit (LLO), and the timing and orientation of the
return approach to LEO.
Accessing a dataset consisting of integrated Earth-to-Moon coast trajectories
parametric with respect to the Earth-Moon plane, LMS iteratively solves for the
recurring geometry required between the regressing Space Station orbit plane
and the lunar ephemeris. For each of a series of Space Station to Moon
opportunities starting at a specified time, a series of return opportunities is found
and data on the opportunities are provided.
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3.1.3.3 Boeing Lunar Trajectory Program
BOLT is a three-degree-of-freedom point mass trajectory simulation program
used to rapidly analyze lunar missions. The LMS program, run in advance,
supplies approximate times and AV values that are input to the BOLT program
for further refinement and analysis. All phases of a mission, including launch,
Earth orbit, thrusting, translunar and trans-Earth coast, lunar orbit, descent, stay
time, ascent, and aerobrake can be included in the same BOLT trajectory.
Analysis can be by explicit forwarding, search, optimization, or a combination of
the three.
The mission analyzed can be as simple as an orbit about the Earth or Moon, or
may have many phases of coasts and burns mixed as desired and including
trips between the Earth and Moon as well as orbits about the Earth or Moon.
Flights to and from the Earth or Moon surface, and stay times on the surface,
may be included. Flight through the atmosphere has drag and can have
controllable lift. Multiple trajectories may be analyzed in the same case,
separately initialized or branched from an earlier condition.
Vehicle modeling is by multiple stages, each with initial dry and propellant
loads. Jettison or transfer of dry and/or propellant weight may be simulated at
any time. Staging off the top and/or bottom may also occur at any time. Stage
thrust is defined as a tabular function of time, and any stage may burn in any
phase with arbitrary cutoff and restart capability.
The BOLT code is portable, having been developed in standard Fortran 77
programming language. The program was initially hosted on microcomputers.
3.1.3.4 Performance and Trajectory Analysis
Several analyses were performed as needed during the period of the STV
study. These analyses included: the effects of Earth orbit departure delays,
including TLI and midcourse correction burn impacts; injection window
considerations from Space Station Freedom (SSF); assessments of mission
aborts and free return; lunar orbit stability; descent and ascent from the lunar
surface; analyses of the Trans-Earth injection (TEl) burn and aerobrake lift to
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drag (L/D) requirementS; and different near-moon trajectory options. The
following sections address specifically some of the abort considerations and the
near-moon trajectory option analyses. These, as well as the remaining
analyses, are discussed in detail in volume II, section 1-1.3.4.
Mission Abort/Free Return Analysis
An analysis of a LEO node based STV showed that, in general, a free return to
the LEO node is not a viable option. Free return is where, after the transfer burn
to the moon, lunar swingby and Earth return are accomplished with no further
main propulsion system burns. Free return is particularly of interest in the event
of system failure(s) precluding a propulsive burn for Earth return. Figure 3.1-3
shows the transfer geometry from a LEO node to the moon with Figure 3.1-4
showing that a free return path does not, in general, arrive at Earth in the plane
of the LEO node (e.g. SSF). This is due to the regression of the LEO node orbit
plane during the 6 days after departure from the LEO base. The heavy shading
in the figure shows the final LEO node orbit plane. Note that these free return
issues are only applicable to s'rv concepts that use a LEO node. Both ground-
based options (GB-1.5S and GO-1.5S) have a free return capability as the
ballistic reentry crew module can return the crew to Earth.
Transfer orbit
/------Moon at
launch
Figure 3.1-3. Lunar Transfer Geometry From SSF
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k._j Special situations can be found supporting free and near-free return to a LEO
node which depend on a near-zero angle between the orbit planes of the Moon
and the LEO node. However, such situations occur only every 19 years, when
the Moon's orbit inclination is near its maximum of 28.5 degrees.
In the event of a need for earliest possible return to the Space Station (or other
LEO node), the overriding problem is the potentially large (up to 57-degree)
angle of the Moon out of the plane of the Space Station's orbit. (Nominal
mission event times are based on the passages of the Moon through this plane,
and the opportunities average about 9 days apart.) Figure 3.1-5 reflects this
worst case condition in the three upper solid "_V required" lines. Available &V
is shown as dashed lines, decreasing in three phases with the nominal burn
expenditures. Even a so called "free return" from translunar trajectory cannot
avoid the requirement for high &V because the Moon is, in general, out of the
plane at the time of flyby. Note that the data presented in Figure 3.1-5 was
generated for the 90-day study reference vehicle (2.5 stage, LEV/LTV scenario,
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Figure 3.1-5. Abort Scenario Capability
using LOR) and is presented here to provide visibility into concerns which must
be addressed.
One way around the problem early in the mission, post-TLI burn, is shown as
the "immediate" return. Here, a downward _V, within the vehicle capability,
reverses the radial rate and allows return to the LEO node. The LEO node orbit
thus has less time to regress, though the increasing plane change requirement
is seen in the upturn of this line. A nominal mission can be planned that
reduces the _V requirement for immediate and later aborts by launching when
the SSF/lunar alignment favors the in-plane geometry.
Options for accommodating aborts with a LEO-based concept depend on the
mission phase and the situation requiring the abort. Options include inclusion
of the necessary AV capability (large performance penalty); the use of a rescue
vehicle to retrieve the crew from a LEO orbit obtained after an abort return (non-
aligned with the LEO node); or waiting until the LEO node orbit is in the
necessary alignment either through (1) use of a LEO parking orbit to wait until
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or (3) waiting on the lunar surface (either of these may require a long wait time
that may be undesirable in emergency situations).
Trajectory Options
Two options for targeting of the near-Moon portion of the trajectory were initially
studied with a third option, subsequently selected, being identified later in the
study. These three options are shown in Figure 3.1-6. Figures depicting these
options in connection with abort considerations are presented in volume II,
section 3.1.3.4.3.
The first option addressed is the lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) approach used
on the Apollo missions. In this option, a Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) burn
establishes a low-inclination circular lunar orbit from the initial free-return
approach path. In general, this approach is used in conjunction with a LLO
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Figure 3.1-6. Lunar Approach Trajectory Options
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node. Operationally, a Lunar excursion vehicle can be stored in LLO with a
transfer vehicle bringing the crew and cargo from Earth and transferring crew
and cargo to the excursion vehicle for the Lunar portion of the mission. Upon
conclusion of the Lunar portion of the mission, the excursion vehicle returns the
crew to the transfer vehicle which returns the crew to Earth while the excursion
vehicle remains in LLO. Alternatively, for single stage vehicle, return propellant,
the aerobrake, or other elements can be stored in LLO to be picked up prior to
return.
The benefit of the LOR approach is that performance is optimized as only mass
required for the lunar portion of the mission is taken to and from the Lunar
surface. There is a significant risk penalty associated with the LOR option as
elements required for Earth return are left in LLO and successful rendezvous,
docking, and mating of several interfaces is required before the crew can be
safely returned to Earth. Additionally, as discussed before, better performance
does not necessarily equate to lower costs. The higher propellant costs for
other approaches are generally offset by the higher development costs for the
elements left in LLO which require station-keeping and rendezvous and
docking capabilities.
The second option is the direct approach where the S'IV departs from the free-
return path about 1 day prior to arrival to target the approach hyperbola to the
landing site. A single-burn descent is initiated from the hyperbolic approach
path. Similarly, ascent is a single burn that establishes a hyperbolic departure
orbit returning to Earth.
Detriments with the direct approach are that direct Sanding and ascent incurs
high gravity losses, especially over sites requiring a nearly vertical trajectory,
which results in the worst performance of the three options. The direct
approach is a fairly risky approach as the vehicle is on an impact path for
approximately one day, after the retargeting for the landing site. In addition, due
to the approach geometry, there are substantial portions of the lunar surface
(primarily on the dark, side but including some areas on the near side) which are
unavailable using the direct option. For these reasons, this approach was not
selected.
3?
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The third option, called the lunar orbit direct (LOD) approach, was developed
later in the study and subsequently selected as the lunar approach trajectory for
the downselected vehicles. In this option, the S'IV departs from the free-retu.rn
path about 1 day prior to arrival to target to a LLO (possibly high inclination)
passing over the landing site. The LLO is elliptical having a minimum pedapsis
altitude (about 5 km), with the orbit oriented to put pedapsis over the landing
site. The descent is a single burn following a fractional or multiple orbit coast.
Similarly, ascent is a single burn to a low periapsis, possibly with a high
inclination orbit from which TEl may occur after a fractional or after multiple
revolutions. There is not necessarily a relation between the lunar orbits used
for descent and ascent in the LOD option. The goal is to be able to land after
only a fractional orbit, however, initial use of multiple orbits may be desired to
prove out navigation techniques.
)
The benefit of the LOD approach is that less risk is incurred, compared to both
the LOR option, as no elements required for return to Earth are left in LLO, and
to the direct approach as the S'iV is not on a direct impact path until just prior to
landing. As all vehicle elements are taken to the lunar surface, this approach
has poorer performance than the LOR approach (although about the same AV
requirements), however, the simplicity of the vehicle design offsets the higher
propellant costs, especially as Earth to Orbit transportation costs decrease.
3.2 SYSTEM TRADE STUDIES
The system trade studies and analyses necessary for definition of the STV
system were identified using a team approach. Issues were brainstormed and
documented and the preferred approach, such as a trade study or ground rule,
for addressing the issues was then identified. An influence matrix was
developed showing the interactions of the trade studies with one another in
order to identify the priority for conducting the trades and identifying the
interactions of trade results with other issues. Figure 3.2-1 shows a tree of the
trades and analyses conducted for each STV program area such as vehicle
design or operations.
The System Architecture Trade Study was a major effort of the STV study and
combined several architecture trades into an overall architecture trade study.
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Several of the architecture trades were interdependent• It was therefore felt that
a combined trade could account for the interactions by providing evaluations of
one trade across different options of other interdependent trades. In this
method, the best combination of architectural options could be determined.
The six trades that were combined in the System Architecture Trade Study
consisted of trades addressing (1) the number of stages, (2) basing options, (3)
the number and operational use of crew modules, (4) use of a low lunar orbit
(LLO) transportation node versus a direct descent to the lunar surface, and for
the space-based options only: (5) use of an aerobrake versus main propulsion
for Earth capture upon return, and (6) use of propellant tankers versus drop
tanks for supply. Evaluation criteda and criteda weighting against which the
options were evaluated consisted of cost (50% weighting), margins and risk
(30% weighting), other mission capture (15% weighting), and benefits to Mars
(5% weighting).
The options defined for the six architecture trades were combined in a matrix
resulting in over 400 possible architectures• Ground rules and assumptions
were applied to reduce these combinations to 94 architectures for which
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performance and mission scenarios were developed. Figure 3.2-2 presents the
scrubbed matrix used to identify the options to be evaluated. Based on this
wQrk, 29 scenarios were selected and initially assessed against the cost and
margins and risk evaluation criteria to determine trending. Based on the
observed trends, 13 additional scenarios were initially included with one being
added later. The resulting 43 scenarios were fully evaluated against the four
evaluation criteria to determine the preferred architectures. Figure 3.2-3
provides an overview of the System Architecture Trade Study process with
section 2-1.1, Volume II discussing both the process and results in detail.
Mission scenarios were developed for each of the 94 architectural options
identified with the reduced matrix. For each option an overview and timeline
was developed, the mission phases and operations in which each generic flight
element was involved were defined, and the characteristics and requirements
for each scenario were identified.
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Using the mission scenarios, unique flight elements were identified and
characterized as shown in Figure 3.2-4. A functional split was made between
flight elements to distinguish mass and subsystem definitions, as well as unique
hardware and operations. In summary, an analysis of the 94 mission scenarios
yielded a total of 546 flight elements. Analysis of these flight elements with
respect to unique mission functions resulted in 33 functionally unique flight
elements. General categories of the flight elements identified and characte'rized
included aerobrakes, transfer stages, ascent stages, lander stages, drop tank
modules, transfer crew modules, and excursion crew modules. An additional
effort conducted as part of the flight element definition was an avionics
functional and location definition. For each of the flight elements, the avionics
functions associated with that flight element was identified. The ultimate goal
was to identify concept differences that distinguished hardware and operations
COSTS.
_=...gl
To support (1) the cost and margins and risk assessments and (2) the
subsystem design task, operations flows were developed for the mission
scenarios. Operations were defined from the start of KSC processing of a new
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Figure 3.2-4. Flight Element Definition Process
vehicle to the end of the mission of its second flight. This covers all major
events, except final disposal, in the vehicle's life, including refurbishment for
reflight.
A diverse source of inputs was considered in developing the operations flows.
Studies have been performed in the past by several major contractors whose
primary purpose was to. define on-orbit operations of an OTV (S'IV or lunar
vehicle). Operations were defined at a major task description level, with a ROM
estimate of task duration hours assigned.
System Architecture Trade Study Evaluation_ In general, the scenarios
were evaluated against each of the four evaluation criteria and then normalized
to a 1 to 5 scale with 1 being the "best" score and 5 being the "worst" score. The
total score was then developed as a summation of the score for each criterion
times the weighting of each criterion.
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Cost Assessment. The cost score was based on a combination of 70% DDT&E
costs and 30% life cycle costs. This approach was based on the belief that the
DDT&E costs, being the driver behind the level of funding required to obtain a
new program start, should be strongly emphasized. All scenarios met the basic
mission requirements, so an affordable funding profile at the beginning of the
program, which would facilitate a program start, was seen as a valid
discriminator.
Figure 3.2-5 shows the process used to develop the life cycle costs for each
scenario. A life cycle cost model then used cost elements associated with each
flight element, boost costs per flight element per mission, and the number of
each kind of flight (steady state, replacement, and expendable cargo) from the
Option 5 mission model along with the non-recurring costs/scenario to
determine the overall life cycle cost for each scenario.
Margins and Risk Assessment. All of the STV system concepts and each of the
subsystems met safety requirements with margins for all contingencies. In
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addition, risks for each mission operation and each mission phase will be
mitigated as much as possible using modern engineering techniques.
However, some system concepts will inherently have margins and some system
concepts will inherently mitigate risks simply because the architecture avoids
particular situations during the mission profile. The margins and risk evaluation
attempted to identify and quantify the risks and margins that are discriminators
between the scenarios.
,,._t-
The risk area was broken into equal weighting between technical and
programmatics risk. Technical risks dealt with the risk during the operational
phase and included such things as mission success, performance and
operation, and safety and reliability. In general, the programmatic risk dealt with
the anticipated risk associated with the FSD program phase (i.e., cost and
schedule).
Mission Caoture Assessment. The purpose of this analysis was to determine
how well the S'iV concepts designed for the lunar missions could capture other
NASA and DoD missions identified as design reference missions. Concepts
were scored both by stage efficiency (how efficient the lunar-sized stage can
perform the other missions; required propellant mass/total start mass, excluding
payload) and by Earth-to-orbit launched mass.
Benefits to Mars A_sessment. Mars mission benefit was one of the evaluation
criteria for STV concept selection with a 5% weighting of the total evaluation
criteria. The purpose of this analysis was to determine how much the STV
concepts, operations, and subsystems, designed for the lunar missions, can
benefit the Mars missions and vehicle designs as they are projected at the
current time. To determine the overall benefit of each of the lunar vehicle
concepts, specific benefits were weighted independently, scored, and then
combined.
System Architecture Trade Study Results. The System Architecture
Trade Study resulted in a downselect to three architecture options for further
definition. All of the scenarios were 1.5-stage vehicles using a single crew
module and the lunar orbit direct trajectory approach for lunar landing. The
main difference in the three scenarios was in the basing and launch
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infrastructure. One scenario was ground based with a single launch, one was
ground based with on-orbit assembly by way of rendezvous and docking, and
the final scenado was a space-based architecture. For the space-based case,
drop tanks were used instead of propellant tankers and an aerobrake was used
for return to SSF.
One of the findings in this trade was that better performance did not necessarily
equate to lower costs. Better performing systems tend to have higher
development and operations costs that outweigh the higher propellant delivery
costs associated with lower performing systems.
Number of Stages. The results of the scenarios compared for the number of
stages trade strongly indicated that fewer stages were preferred, with the single-
stage scenarios (with drop tanks) being the clear winners. Although the single
stages, in general, did not have the best performance, the reduction in
operational complexity and development costs for the fewer stage vehicles
outweighed the performance penalties.
Crew Module ADoroach. The single and hybrid crew module approaches were
close, with the dual crew module losing. In general, the single crew modules
had the lowest cost and the hybrid crew modules had less risk because of the
presence of two independently pressurized volumes available for the majority of
the mission. The dual crew modules had the highest costs because of the LLO
basing of the crew module and the higher costs associated with development of
two elements. Note that the hybrid and dual crew modules were options only
when a LLO node was used for mass storage during the missions (i.e., LOR
lunar approach trajectory option). Based on the generally better scores for the
single crew module, along with the results of the lunar approach trajectory
trade, the single crew module was selected.
CAMUS Incorporated, a consulting company formed by astronauts William
Pogue and Gerry Carr, which was under subcontract for this study, assessed
the crew module options from a safety and abort perspective. Their
assessment, in summary, was that: the single crew module was preferred for
operational simplicity. Also, undesirable risk was introduced by the other crew
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module options that required rendezvous and docking, possible long storage
periods in orbit, and on-orbit mating of multiple interfaces.
Basin o Location. In general, the two ground-based options scored better than
the two space-based options because of generally lower costs and reduced
risks. The ground-based, orbital assembly option scored best on costs because
all refurbishment operations took place on the ground. The ground-based,
single launch concept also had ground refurbishment; however, this option
incurred a $7 billion penalty for development of the large booster (==260 metric
tons). The lunar and Mars missions were seen as the only missions benefiting
from this size booster with the lunar missions having the initial requirement and
thus a share of the development costs (primarily facilities modifications). Note
that the space-based scenarios, nominally based at Space Station Freedom,
incurred a $4.5 billion cost for modifications to SSF. This cost estimate, taken
from the General Dynamics Space Transportation Infrastructure Study (STIS),
was broken down into top-level elements and examined and accepted as a
reasonable estimate.
One of the intentions of the study was to develop and provide a decision
database with basing being seen as a primary issue in the definition of the s'rv.
For these reasons, the three basing options were retained in the downselected
scenarios to allow more detailed definition of the impacts and costs of the
different basing approaches. The different basing approaches depend, in many
respects, on other space transportation infrastructure considerations. For
example, the ground-based, single-launch concept requires booster capability
on the order of 260 metric tons; the ground-based, orbital assembly concept
requires booster capability on the order of 125 metric tons; and the space-
based concept requires a 71 metric ton booster. By carrying the three options, a
database is available in response to other infrastructure decisions. An
examination of the top 10 scores reveals that, if the LOR approach is not used,
the top three scenarios were selected for further definition.
Lunar Aooroach Trajectory. At the time the System Architecture Trade Study
was being conducted, only two lunar approach options had been identified.
After the trade was nearly complete, the two-burn lunar orbit direct (LOD)
approach was identified. An assessment of this approach showed that, in terms
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of the evaluation criteria used, LOD was similar to the direct approach. The
direct approach was seen to be preferred over the LOR approach and the
differences between the direct appr.oach and LOD only favored LOD.
CAMUS was also asked to assess the lunar approach trajectory options in
terms of safety and abort considerations. Their assessment was that the LOD
approach appears feasible and worth pursuing, initial use of the fractional orbit
approach may be optimistic, and the initial use of multiple orbits with growth to
the fractional orbit approach may be desirable. Also, leaving elements required
for Earth return in LLO for up to 6 months during the missions (LOR approach)
introduces dsk and is not the preferred approach. The LOD approach builds on
Apollo experience instead of duplicating it. If a multiple orbit LOD scenario is
initially selected, accommodations for growth to the fractional orbit approach
should be guaranteed (i.e., not precluded by configuration, propulsion, and so
forth).
Aerobraked Versus AII-Prooulsive Return. Cost slightly favored all-propulsive
return, influenced both by the 70% DD't'&E component of the cost scoring
(effectively penalizing the aerobrake) and the low boost cost of $1000/kg, which
favored the all-propulsive approach with the required additional propellant
available in LEO at a relatively low cost. Margins and risk, somewhat obviously,
also favored the all-propulsive approach because this type of operation has
been performed before whereas use of the aerobrake would entail an all new
development. The benefits to Mars criterion favored, again somewhat
obviously, the aerobrake approach as aerobraking is required for a Mars
landing. Note that the margins and risk and benefits to Mars cdteda tended in
opposite directions as new technology and operational approaches obviously
entail a higher level of risk than use of existing hardware and operational
concepts. The relative weighting of the criteda was an important factor in the
all-propulsive approach having the best scores.
The aerobrake was retained in the interest of developing the technical database
and aerobrake details. Additionally, the evaluation methodology did not allow
for higher weighted scoring based on mitigating factors. In this case, the lunar
transportation system is the only SEI opportunity to prove out aerobraking,
unlike other technology and operational areas that will benefit from
4"1
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development and operation of SSF, the lunar base, new ETO systems, and so
forth.
Droo tanks Versus Use of ProDellant Tankers. Two scenario pairs were used to
trade the use of drop tanks versus the use of propellant tanker's. Note that this
trade (along with the entire system architecture trade) was based on the lunar
missions only, with the exception of the mission capture evaluation, which used
the lunar transportation system optimized elements as required to perform the
non-lunar design reference missions. Based on the lunar missions, the use of
drop tanks was slightly favored over the use of propellant tankers and was
selected as the baseline for the space-based vehicles.
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3.3 RECOMMENDED APPROACHES
%..,
3.3.1 Vehicle Descriptions
The purpose of this s'rv study was to identify and study a transportation system
from Earth orbit to the lunar surface and look at its applicability to other orbital
transportation needs. This section provides an overview of the s'rv concepts
resulting from system architecture trades, mission analyses, and subsystem
trades. The selected concepts are shown in Figure 3.3.1.1 and include a
space-based, single-stage vehicle with expendable drop tanks; a ground-
based, single-stage multiple-launch vehicle with expendable drop tanks and
lunar lander; and a ground-based, single-stage single-launch vehicle with
expendable drop tanks and lunar lander, The two ground-based concepts are
similar in design, but the multiple-launch concept includes a LO2 tanker for
filling vehicle LO2 tanks on orbit. All concepts have a single crew module for
piloted missions and use a lunar-surface-direct transfer, requiring no
Space Based (SB)
Ground Based
Multiple Launch
Ground Based
Single Launch
5 Launches
70 mt booster
Assembly
required
2 Launches
125 mt booster
Docking and
refuelling
1 Launches
250 mt booster
No assembly
required
Figure3.3.1-1. STV Concepts
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rendezvous in lunar orbit. The space-based core vehicle uses an aerobraking
maneuver to return the crew module and core stage to the Space Station or
other LEO node; however, on the ground-based vehicle only the crew module
returns to the ground and is recovered. These three concepts satisfy current
study requirements and were chosen to carry forward for further study.
Space-Based Vehicle Overview. This section discusses the configuration
of a space-based S'IV with selected flight elements based at the Space Station
or other LEO node. It includes a top-level description of the core stage, crew
module, and drop tank sets and gives mass properties, performance, launch
and recovery operations, and the use of lunar-designed flight elements for
capture of other non-lunar missions.
A few of the issues addressed by the current space-based concept include the
following"
1. Two engine-out operation capability.
2. Fit within the launch shroud diameter.
3. Visibility of lunar landing pads and horizon.
4. Aeromaneuver capability, including minimizing wake impingement,
meeting IJD requirements, and keeping within TPS limitations.
5. Vehicle reusability.
The space-based vehicle is made up of the following subsystems, as shown in
Figure 3.3.1-2:
o Structures and Mechanisms - Includes a core stage with external load-
bearing body structure and landing gear, a rigid aerobrake, a pressurized
crew module, two sets of "ILl drop tanks, and two sets of descent drop
tanks.
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Figure 3.3.1-2. Space-Based Subsystem Overview
2. Main Tankage - The core stage has two cylindrical LO2 tanks and two
cylindrical LH2 tanks with associated propellant acquisition devices. Each
drop tank set has a single LO2 tank and a single LH2 tank with associated
slosh baffles and propellant acquisition devices.
3, Protection - Includes thermal control and damage protection of the main
cryogenic tanks, thermal control of avionics and power equipment, thermal
and radiation protection of the crew during long-duration exposure in
space, and thermal protection of the aerobrake during the aerobraking
maneuver.
4. Main Propulsion - Consists of six 66,800N (15,000-1b) thrust advanced
expander-cycle engines (Isp = 481 seconds) with electromechanical
actuation and propellant delivery, pressurization, fill, and vent systems.
5. Reaction Control - Includes four GO2/GH2 (Isp = 410 second) thruster
modules and associated accumulators, pressurization, and control.
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6. Electrical Power Features redundant O2/H2" fuel cells fed from
accumulators filled from the vehicle main propellant tanks, as well as
distribution and control units and associated wire harnesses.
7. Guidance and Navigation - Provisions for lunar mission operations,
including rendezvous, docking, and lunar landing, with built-in redundancy
for piloted operations.
8. Communication and Data Handling Provisions for communication,
vehicle health maintenance, and data handling, with audio and video
interfaces for piloted operations and instrumentation for drop tank
monitoring and control.
9. Displays and Controls - Provisions on the crew module for limited crew
control and status monitoring of the vehicle during critical phases of the
mission.
10. Environmental Control - Provisions on the crew module for atmosphere
supply and control, internal equipment cooling, and metabolic and
equipment heat rejection.
11. Personnel Provisions - Food, water, and waste management systems as
well as fire detection and crew furnishings on the crew module.
The current space-based vehicle concept can either deliver 9,870 kg of cargo to
the lunar surface in a piloted mode or 52,683 kg in a cargo-delivery mode. With
this cargo split, 418 tons of cargo can be delivered to the lunar surface in 21
piloted and 4 cargo-only missions. The size of the vehicle is common to both
piloted and cargo-only missions.
Sequential mass properties for the space-based STV are shown in Figure
3.3.1-3.
Ground-Based Vehicle Overview. This section discusses the
configuration of a ground-based s'rv, including a single-launch concept and a
multiple-launch concept. It includes a top-level description of the core stage,
crew module, delivery segment, and drop tank sets and gives mass properties,
performance, launch and recovery operations, and the use of lunar-designed
flight elements for capture of other non-lunar missions.
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Figure 3.3.1-3. Space-Based Vehicle Sequential Mass and Fluid
Inventory
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A few of the issues addressed by the current ground-based concepts include
the following:
1. Minimization of on-orbit assembly.
2. Two engine-out operation capability.
3. Crew launch-escape capability in the case of an on-pad emergency.
4. Visibility of lunar landing pads and horizon.
5. Payload accessibility.
6. Lunar surface crew access.
7. Lunar surface staging (i.e., liftoff from a stable platform).
8. Capture of non-lunar CNDB missions.
The ground-based vehicle includes the following subsystems, as shown in
Figure 3.3.1-4:
g.r.e.u_T.a.]_
Aluminum-Lithium
Titanium fittings
MLI blankets
Meteroid protection
Power
• GH/GO fuel cells
• Ni/H2 batteries
Reaction Control
• GO2JGH2 thrusters
• Accumulators fed
from main tanks
•Four crew
•Two EVA hatches
•Open ECLSS
•ALSPE shelter
• Parafoil
• Landing gear
Structures &
• Aluminum
• Graphite composites
•Crush core shock
struts on landing
gear
Prooulsion
Advanced Space engine
• Thrust = 15000 Ibf
Figure 3.3.1-4. Ground-Based Vehicle Subsystem Overview
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1. Structures and Mechanisms - Includes a core stage with external Ioad-
bea}'ing body structure, a lunar lander with landing gear, a pressurized
crew module with an external aerodynamic shell, two sets of TLI drop
tanks, and two sets of delivery dropstages.
2. Main Tankage - The core tankset and each drop tank set has a single LO2
tank and a single LH2 tank with associated slosh baffles and propellant
acquisition devices. The LO2 tanker is a single tank with internal stiffening
and slosh baffling.capable of withstanding launch conditions fully loaded.
3. Protection - Includes thermal control and damage protection of the main
cryogenic tanks, thermal control of avionics and power equipment, thermal
and radiation protection of the crew during long-duration exposure in
space, and thermal protection of the crew module for the reentry
maneuver.
4. Main Propulsion - Consists of a total of six 66,800N (15, 000-tb) thrust
advanced expander-cycle engines (Isp = 481 second) with
electromechanical actuation and propellant delivery, pressurization, fill,
and vent systems.
5. Reaction Control - includes four GO2/GH2 thruster modules (Isp = 410
second) on the delivery stages and four on the crew module, with
associated accumulators, pressurization, and control.
6. Electrical Power- Features redundant O2/H2 fuel cells fed from
accumulators filled from the vehicle main propellant tanks, as well as
distribution and control units and associated wire harnesses.
7. Guidance and Navigation Provisions for lunar mission operations,
including rendezvous, docking, and lunar landing, with built-in redundancy
for piloted operations.
8. Communication and Data Handling - Provisions for communication,
vehicle health maintenance, and data handling, with audio and video
interfaces for piloted operations and instrumentation for drop tank
monitoring and control.
9. Displays and Controls - Provisions on the crew module for limited crew
control and status monitoring of the vehicle during critical phases of the
mission.
10. Environmental Control - Provisions on the crew module for atmosphere
supply and control, internal equipment cooling, and metabolic and
equipment heat rejection.
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11." Personnel Provisions - Food, water, and waste management systems as
well as fire detection and crew furnishings on the crew module.
The current ground-based vehicle concept can either deliver 11,630 kg of cargo
to the lunar surface in a piloted mode or 43,443 kg in a cargo-delivery mode.
With this cargo split, a total of 418 tons of cargo is delivered to the lunar surface
over 21 piloted and 4 cargo-only missions. The sizes of the vehicle flight
elements are common to both piloted and cargo-only missions. As was already
mentioned, the ascent tankset is not required for the cargo-only lunar mission.
Sequential mass properties for the ground-based lunar piloted mission are
shown in Figure 3.3.1-5
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Mass Properties Summary
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Figure 3.3.1-5. Ground-Based Vehic/e Sequential Mass and F/uid
Inventory
57
D180-32040-1
BgfJNO
3.3.2 Operations Descriptions
Space-Based Vehicle. The selected space-based concept is a cryogenic
vehicle with a reusable core stage and two pairs of expendable drop tanks, as
shown in Figure 3.3.2-1. For piloted lunar missions, the core stage is flown with
landing gear, a crew module, and a rigid space-assembled aerobrake. For
unpiioted lunar cargo-delivery missions, the core stage is flown in an
expendable mode without the crew module and aerobrake. The drop tanks for
both missions include a pair of tanksets holding translunar injection (TLI)
propellant and a pair of tanksets holding lunar-descent propellant. The vehicle
has six main engines, allowing two engine-out capability during all mission
phases.
The lunar mission sequential configuration of the vehicle is depicted in Figure
3.3.2-2. The aerobrake must be launched in sections to fit in the launch shroud,
assembled on orbit, and then attached to the core vehicle with the crew module.
TLI drop_
tanks "X_
/
Descent Car
tanks (2) volume (2)
Features
• 50 ft dla aerobrake
• Larqest element 65 mt
1"I( .I tankset)
• Reentry L/D >.2
• Asymmetric vehicle
(offset crew module)
• Launchable in 30 ft
shroud
• 15 ft x =o cargo envelope
(expendable missions)
• Recovery to SSF
• Reuse all high value
elements
• Crew module fits in
Shuttle cargo bay
• Self unloadable
Figure 3.3.2-1. Space-Based Vehicle
58
D180-32040-1
Bg, E'IAI/'O
Mission start
Fully assembled
configuration
EuD.aLat.rJ_v 
TLI tanks
discarded
Lunar ascent
Vehicle core and
aerobrake
Figure 3.3.2-2. Space-Based Vehicle Configuration Sequence
The crew module is offset from the vehicle centerline to provide lunar landing
visibility and center-of-gravity offset for the aeromaneuver, as shown in Figure
3.3.2-3. The TLI tanksets, lunar descent tanksets, and cargo are launched in
three to four launches and integrated with the core, and the core tanks are filled
from a LEO tank farm prior to each mission.
During the mission, the TLI tanks are dropped after the TLI burn and the vehicle
descends to the lunar surface following lunar injection. During descent, the
core ascent tanks remain full, balancing the center of gravity to the centerline
during the critical descent. For landing, the crew can view two landing pads
and the horizon over the top of the cargo pallet. Upon arrival, the descent tanks
are removed, the cargo is unloaded, the vehicle is hooked up to lunar surface
support equipment, and the crew moves to the lunar habitat for the lunar stay.
Because of the aerobrake overhang, cargo must be unloaded from the side of
the core and moved to the base, either with built-in provisions or using a lunar
flatbed trailer, as shown in Figure 3.3.2-4. At the end of the lunar stay, the crew
loads return cargo, boards, and checks out the vehicle, then the core vehicle
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Ascent
tanks
rew module
The returning vehicle is asymmetric and has an offset
crew cab to provide the cg offset required for |
.. ae ro bra____k_!n_g.: .v_ ........................ .........±_............-__
Figure 3.3.2-3. Space-Based Crew Module Integration
ascends and returns to the LEO node, using an aeromaneuver, where it is
inspected and refurbished for the next flight.
For the unpiloted mission, the core stage is flown without the crew module and
aerobrake and is left on the lunar surface with the descent tanksets after
landing.
For initial piloted missions, the core stage, crew module, and aerobrake are
launched empty to the Space Station or LEO node aboard a heavy-lift launch
vehicle, assembled, and then fueled from a propellant depot. The drop tanks
are launched fully loaded aboard three heavy-lift launch vehicles (HLLV) and
integrated with the core stage, and then the crew and cargo are launched
aboard a shuttle to the completed stage. The core stage returns to the LEO
node after each mission, where it can be used for subsequent lunar missions or
for other non-lunar missions.
6O
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1
I TLI tanks actuallyJettisoned before landll
!
Figure 3.3.2-4. Space-Based Payload Unloading
Ground-Based Vehicle. The two selected ground-based concepts are
cryogenic vehicles with a reusable crew module and avionics pallet, an
expendable core stage made up of a propulsion module and tankset, a pair of
expendable TL! drop tank sets, a pair of expendable delivery stages, and an
expendable lunar lander platform. Figure 3.3.2-5 shows a single-launch
concept in which all flight elements are launched full in a single HLLV launch.
Figure 3.3.2-6 shows a concept in which most of the LO2 is launched in a
separate launch and transferred to the main vehicle in LEO. In both cases, on-
orbit assembly is minimized. The vehicles each have six main engines,
allowing two engine-out capability during all mission phases.
t,
The on-orbit operations of the multiple-launch vehicle are depicted in Figure
3.3.2-7. The LO2 tanker is launched initially and remains on orbit until the core
vehicle launch. The core vehicle is launched with a crew module escape
6t
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Crew Module
__,C Strap-on
boosters (2)
\
Payload
TLI tanks not cannisters (4)
shown
Features
• Single launch with 260t
booster, no rendezvous
• 13.7 m dia launch shroud
• Six 15klb thrust engines
• Cargo envelope: 4.5 m dia
x 12.2 m (piloted), 4.5 m
dla x o_ (expendable)
• Self unloadable
• Crew module ground
recoverable
• Strap-on boosters usable
as separate upper stage
Figure 3.3.2-5. Ground-Based, Single-Launch Vehicle
Crew Module integration
Strap-on Features
- bo¢ st, rs (2) • No on-orbit vehicleN
Tanker launched 1st with
• , _ oxy en offloaded from
• stage13.7 m dia launch shroud
• Six 15klb thrust engines
• Car(;IO envelope: 4.5 m dia
x 72.2 m (piloted), 4.5 m
dla x _o (expendable)
____ .Self unloadable
• Crew module ground
recoverable
• Strap-on boosters usable
as separate upper stage
Payload
TLI tanks not cannisters (4)
shown
Figure 3.3.2-6. Ground.Based, Multi-Launch Vehicle
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• Perform settling burn
• Transfer liquid oxygen
• Disconnect LES / tanker
berthing structure & transfer
umbilical
• Back STV away from tanker
• Tanker performs deorbit burn
Figure 3.3.2-7. Ground-Based Orbital Refueling Operation
structure that includes a docking mechanism and tank fill provisions. It docks
with the tanker, fills its L02 tanks, and then jettisons the tanker, escape
structure, and fill plumbing. From that point, both ground-based concepts are
similar in mission configuration.
The common configuration sequence of the ground-based STV is shown in
Figure 3.3.2-8. The TLI tanks are dropped after the TLI burn and the vehicle
descends to the lunar surface following lunar injection with the lander, core
stage, delivery stages, and cargo. During landing, the crew can view two
landing pads and the horizon over the top of the cargo pallets. Upon arrival, the
cargo is unloaded and the delivery stages, with one engine each, are either
removed or tilted aside. The vehicle is hooked up to lunar surface support
equipment and the crew moves to the lunar habitat for the lunar stay. Cargo
can be unloaded from the side of the core, as shown in Figure 3.3.2-9, and
moved to the base, either with built-in provisions or using a lunar flatbed trailer.
At the end of the lunar stay, the crew loads return cargo, boards using a hoist,
and checks out the vehicle. Then the core vehicle ascends, with the
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TLI tanks discarded
Mission start
Fully assembled
configuration
].U_ILa=_ZU_
Vehicle core,
descent stages
discarded
Figure 3.3.2-8 Ground-Based Vehicle Configuration Sequence
i ,
_pm
t
I--'4------
. Self unloading _1
• Cargo split into four pieces m
• Ramps integral to cargo pallet m
• Relatively low c.g. for landing stability_
Figure 3.3.2-9. Ground-Based Payload Unloading
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expendable lander acting as a launch platform. The core stage is expended
prior to reentry, and the crew module with avionics pallet reenters and lands
near the launch site (Figure 3.3.2-10), where it is inspected and refurbished for
the next flight.
For unpiloted lunar cargo-delivery missions, neither the crew module nor the
ascent tankset are required. The core propulsion module with the avionics
pallet is left on the lunar surface with the lander and delivery stages.
The ground-based vehicle can be operated in either of two launch modes. The
entire vehicle with crew and cargo can be launched to orbit fully loaded aboard
a very heavy lift launch vehicle (single-launch ground-based) or it can be
taunched in two or more smat/er launches (multiple-launch, on-orbit
rendezvous). For the latter case, the first launch would include the vehicle with
offloaded L02 tanks, and the second launch would include a tanker to fill the
vehicle L02 tanks. In both cases, the only reusable element is the crew module
Scarfed biconic shape
L/D > .8
Parafoil recovery
Refurbishable
Independent RCS
Capable of surviving
water ditch
Figure 3.3.2-10. Ground Recovered Crew Module
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with the avionics pallet, which reenters the Earth's atmosphere and returns to
the ground where it is refurbished and reused.
3.3.3 Mission Capture
Evolutionary Mission Capture. The selected vehicle concepts are
designed pdmadly to satisfy both piloted and unpiloted lunar missions, but other
non-lunar missions may also be captured by elements of the lunar-designed
vehicles. Specific mission requirements based on the 1989 civil needs
database (CNDB) are given in Figure 3.3.3-1 in terms of mission type, delta-V
requirements, and design payloads.
For the lunar missions, the delivered cargo assumed in the design is optimized
for each vehicle, based on an optimum split between piloted and unpiloted
missions, and is different from the CNDB amount on a per-mission basis.
5O
40
3O
Deiiv.
Payload
Mass
-! 2O
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2O0O
I ,.,.
4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Misadon Delta-V - m/s
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andGii CrewModull
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] PlloWd o*' 9ar_icing with R_lJm
[] LunarOutpo*lsupper
Mission
N1 NuclearDebris Disposal
G1 GEO Delivery
P1 Planetary Delivery
D1 Molniya Delivery
Sl Polar PlatformServicing(GB)
$1 Polar PlatformServicing(SB)
L4 LunarCargo Delivery
C1 Capsule Recovery- Piloted
G2 GEE)Servicing- Piloted
L3 Lunar Excursion- Piloted
DeltaV (m/s) Deliv. Return
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4202 1862 4000 ** 4000 **
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Figure 3.3.3-1.
** Excluding Mass of Crew Module
CNDB Mission Requirements
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Space-Based Vehicle. For capture of unpiloted non-lunar missions, the
core stage of the space-based lunar-designed vehicle can be used as a
delivery stage, without landing gear and with fewer, less-advanced engines,
such as RL10's. For more demanding missions, descent and TLI tanksets can
lie added for larger propellant loads. Cargo delivery capabilities of various
flight element configurations of the space-based vehicle are shown in Figure
3.3.3-2. Also shown are the design mission payloads and delta-V's.
Unpiloted delivery missions, shown as single points on the chart, are captured
by the core stage with RL10's and descent tanksets, except for the lunar cargo
delivery mission (L4) and recoverable polar platform servicing mission ($1),
which require additional tanksets. Piloted missions with both delivery and
return legs, are shown as groupings of delivered mass (including return stage,
crew module, and delivered payload) to delivered payload and return mass
Dell.
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CNDB Missionsare Captured by Components of a Lunar Mission-designedVehicle,
Figure 3.3.3-2. Space-Based Vehicle Element Capabilities
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(including crew module and return payload) to return payload. The core stage
captures the sample return mission (C1) delivery and return legs, the lunar (L3)
return, and the GEO servicing (G2) return. Additional delivery tanksets increase
the capability to capture the G2 mission delivery, and additional TLI tanksets
and landing gear increase the capability to capture the lunar piloted and cargo
mission deliveries.
Ground-Based Vehicle. For capture of non-lunar unpiloted missions the
delivery stage portion of the ground-based vehicle can be used as an
independent vehicle with an avionics/power pallet and RL10 engine. For non-
lunar piloted missions, the ascent stage with crew module and avionics/power
pallet can be used. For greater capability, an ascent stage with avionics/power
pallet and two delivery stages can be integrated onto a lander platform. Cargo
delivery capabilities of various configurations of the ground-based STV
concept, as well as CNDB mission payloads and delta-V's are given in Figure
3.3.3-3.
Peyk_d
.4
" Optknlzed cargo q:lit Is 43.4 t /
I .....................
Figure 3.3.3-3. Ground-Based Vehicle Capabilities
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Unpiloted delivery missions, shown as single points on the chart, are captured
by a single delivery stage with RL10 except for the lunar cargo delivery mission,
which requires the lunar vehicle with advanced engines. Piloted missions for
both delivery and return legs are shown as groupings of delivered mass
(including return stage, crew module, and delivered payload) to delivered
payload and return mass (including crew module and return payload) to return
payload. The sample return mission (C1) delivery and return is captured by the
ascent stage only, as are the piloted lunar (L3) return and GEO servicing (G2)
return. For the delivery leg of the G2 mission, a combination of descent stages
and lander platform is required, and for delivery of the lunar piloted cargo
mission, the full lunar vehicle is required.
3.3.4 Ground and Space Interface Requirements
The interface requirements for the three configurations studied are strongly
affected by the assumptions that went into the subsystems, operations concepts,
and external systems concepts of the three vehicles. Remembering that the
three vehicles were developed with an eye toward the difference in ETO launch
capabilities, this variation in capability has dramatic impacts on required
interfaces. It is also important to remember that since the fundamental mission
of the three vehicle concepts is identical, most of the interface requirements are
common to the three vehicles. In other words, although the space-based
vehicles may have an additional set of interfaces (i.e., with the Space Station),
the vehicles all have a common set of interface requirements to payloads, lunar
surface systems, and launch vehicle. An overview of these external interfaces
is most clearly provided by considering location during different mission
phases. These interfaces can be subdivided into ground processing, launch
vehicle, low Earth orbit interfaces, and the interfaces between the vehicle and
the lunar base.
Ground Interfaces. All three vehicle will use the facilities of and launch from
the Cape Kennedy Space Center. Any differences between the concepts result
from the size of the elements launched. In all cases propellant tanks, crew
modules, lunar payloads, and vehicle stages (including avionics & propulsion)
must be integrated, checked out and launched. Even the space "assembled"
vehicle was anticipated to be preintegrated on the ground for fit and function,
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then broken into the 5 elements for launch to the station. New integration
facilities were conceptualized and priced for each vehicle concept - details are
contained in volumes II Book 3. The only significant concept unique facility
requirement is for the (space based) aerobrake deployment and restow
activities. The other major unique difference between the concepts from a
processing standpoint is the space based concept will launch the crew module
empty and unpiloted, where the other two concepts will launch the crew inside
the module, and require special pad escape contingencies.
Launch Vehicle Interfaces. All three vehicles will require some type of
heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV). The size of this launch vehicle varies from a
71 metric ton booster for the space-based vehicle to a 125 metric ton booster for
the ground-based, multiple-launch vehicle and finally to 250 metric tons for the
ground-based, single-launch vehicle. In all of these HLLV configurations, the
S'IV will require pad based propellant fill, drain and vent (cryogenic hydrogen
and oxygen) with ground-based power and thermal conditioning, and
potentially a "bent pipe" or RF "shroud window" for telemetry and command
feedthrough while still on the ground. Last minute crew access will be required,
but access for vehicle LRU changeout is still undefined. Current designs for
future launch vehicles seek to minimize/eliminate on pad LRU changeout to
enable lower cost & higher dependability. This could be accomodated by S'IV
by having extra layers of redundancy and to "fly with failures" - however, that
would require a major change in manned spaceflight practice.
The STV may also require power, thermal conditioning, and communications
porting during launch vehicle flight (although power/thermal independance
could be designed into the S'FV). For unpiloted launches a flight termination
system (FTS) to provide for safe disposal of the vehicle in the case of launch
vehicle failures will be provided. For the piloted flights a launch escape system
(LES) is provided to separate the crew module from the rest of the STV/launch
vehicle stack in case of failures. A flight termination system with a safety
interlock system (to ensure no FTS initiation until after sufficient LES
separation) would then destroy the stack. Carrying an FTS on piloted flights
requires careful design considerations, but the current STS external tank and
SRB range safety systems provide an example of currently flown systems.
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LEO Interfaces. The requirements for LEO interfaces are the most significant
difference between the three configurations studied. On the ground-based,
single-launch vehicle, the vehicle has no requirements for any LEO interfaces.
This vehicle is launched intact on board the 250 metric ton booster and hence
may only to stay in LEO long enough to perform systems checkout before
departing for the Moon, if it needs to establish an earth orbit at all.
The ground-based, multiple-launch vehicle is launched on board a booster that
is not large enough to launch the entire fully fueled vehicle into orbit.
Consequently, this vehicle will be launched fully integrated but without
approximately 80% of the liquid oxygen required to go to the Moon. The
remaining oxygen will be launched on board an oxygen tanker. This provides
for essentially equal mass elements (when the launch vehicle shroud is taken
into account - the tanker requires a much smaller shroud).
This oxygen tanker, as currently configured, will be an independent space
vehicle that will be launched first, stationkeep in LEO, then dock with the STV
and transfer fuel. However, the tanker could also be attached to some type of
space tug (cargo transfer vehicle) that would provide the vehicle with any
reaction control subsystem, propulsion, power, and avionics capability that the
tanks require. The docking interface (shown in figure 2.1-5) uses the launch
escape system structure to transmit the structural loads to the vehicle structure.
(The launch escape rocket detaches after the launch vehicle passes through
300,000 feet altitude.) On this structure is mounted the fill lines to the main
oxygen manifold. All the vehicle oxygen tanks are filled using this manifold,
partial gravity can be supplied by propellant settling burns of the reaction
control system. After emptying the oxygen, the tank is deorbited into the earth's
atmosphere where it burns up.
The space-based vehicle has the most extensive LEO interface requirements of
the three vehicles. This vehicle design requires a node that will have the
capability to assemble, store, refuel, and refurbish the vehicle. As such, the
node will have to be able to provide element manipulation, debris shielding,
propellant handling and conditioning, subsystem LRU changeout, and
consumable remanifest capability.
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Lunar Surface Interfaces. The current level II systems requirements
document (SRD) requires the lunar outpost provide simple beacons as landing
aids for unpiloted STVs and lights and markings for piloted flights. Initial
unpiloted S'I'Vs must land a certain number of times without these aids; and
current navigational accuracy capabilities show the S'I'Vs may not require the
beacons to meet current landing precision requirements (land within 5m of a
designated point).
Of the other requirements levied by the S'IV on the lunar outpost systems, the
most significant is that the STV will require subsystem support for stays longer
than 30 days. (Current plans provide for up to 6-12 month stays on the lunar
surface.) The chief subsystems needing support are communications, power,
cryogenic fluid management, and meteroid protection. After the crew leaves the
S'IV vehicle for an extended stay at the lunar outpost, the vehicle will be
powered down (toa maintenance level) and covered with an enclosure to
provide additional meteroid protection. Bringing this protective mass to the
moon once, and using it during all subsequent vehicle stays is much more
efficient than designing each vehicle for 6 months of unprotected exposure.
Likewise, the systems to maintain the cryogenic hydrogen for the 6 month stay
can be more efficiently be brought once than penalize each flight. These
support systems can be thought of as a lunar "ground cart" equivalent to similar
launch pad ground carts that provide temporary support better left off the
vehicle.
As a design goal, the lunar outpost will not be required to provide planned
maintenance beyond placing the S'I'V into storage mode. However, expended
STV elements will be cannibalized for use by the lunar outpost. Interfaces and
elements will be common between STV and the lunar outpost systems
whenever possible.
The lunar base will provide for a relay to Earth of s'r'v telemetry whenever the
STV is on the surface. The lunar base to STV link will be a safe system, such as
low-power RF. Otherwise the STV would be required tQ broadcast directly to
Earth which may present a hazard to an EVA crew.
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Lunar Mission Payloads. The STV will transport essentially all of the
equipment required for the buildup and maintenance of the lunar outpost. The
outpost element design and the STV cargo capabilities are therefore ineluctably
tied. In fact the one constant between the three STV concepts has been the
cargo carrying capability: approxirnately 50 metric tons for the cargo
expendable mode, and 13 tons for the piloted reusable mode. Cargo offioading
is illustrated in figures 1.1-1 and 1.1-2, with additional detail in Volume Ii, Book
1.
The lunar outpost equipment description was taken from Option 5 of the Lunar
Initiative and were based on an informational data book written by NASA-JSC
(Initial Study Period Results Summary - Planet Surface Systems - Conceptual
Design and Development Requirements) defining the 27 STV flight manifests
and planetary surface systems to be taken as cargo by the STV. The primary
interface with the cargo will be structural and status data - which will be
transmitted to earth interleaved in normal STV vehicle telemetry. While no
active thermal cooling interfaces are required, some pointing or thermal roll
attitudes may be required for the cargo to properly cool itself. Power
requirements can be met either with a cargo pallet kit, or additional STV fuel cell
reactants and associated tankage - which reduce payload capacity accordingly.
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3.4 PROGRAMMATICS
3.4.1 Development Schedule
STV Phase C/D Program Schedule.
The Space Transfer Vehicle Phase C/D Program Schedule was developed by
conducting a detailed assessment of all major tasks required to accomplish Full
Scale development and launch of the first three STV test vehicles. Major
milestones which drive the overall schedule include Preliminary Design Review
(PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Subsystem Qual complete, Small Vehicle
Pathfinder complete, 1st and 2nd S'FV Test Flights, LTS Qual and Pathfinder
complete and the LTS Test Flight. A key requirement is successful integration
of critical technology tests and demonstrations into the system design process
(ref. Vol. II Book 4). which has been a major planning focus for this study.
Interrelationships between specific activities are identified by the STV Phase
C/D Logic Network which also highlights two separate critical paths. The
primary critical path goes through the Advanced Propulsion activity while the
Software Development schedule establishes the secondary critical path. All
major tasks as identified in the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) are included
and grouped together in the following vehicle process elements:
LTV Core Staee- Includes design, fab assembly, and test of all subsystem
elements required to support integration of the first two STV test vehicles and
the LTS test vehicle. Two separate Core Propulsion schedules are identified.
The modified RL 10-A4 Engine development results in a qualified engine
available for the first STV test vehicle. The advanced engine schedule
identifies what is required to provide new 480 Isp engines for the LTS test
vehicle. The primary critical path flows through the propulsion schedule.
design and development of the STV flight software as well as software test
facilities to support each STV test vehicle. The mission control software
schedule is required to support the first S'FV vehicle pathfinder activity.
LTV Droo Tarl_- Includes design, fab, assembly, integration and test of all
elements of the fuel tank sets required for each STV test vehicle. The physical
tanks must be integrated with the avionics, attitude control, and fluid supply
subsystems prior to final assembly and integration with the core vehicle.
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L._- Includes design, fab, assembly, and test of each component of the
Tanker subsystem. As with the Drop Tanks, the Tanker hardware is integrated
with The attitude control, avionics, and fluid supply elements to support two
separate Tanker set launches 20 days prior to the 2nd STV and 1st LTS test
flights.
D.._- Identifies the schedule requirements to procure, design, fab,
assemble, and test each element of the Crew module in support of the 2nd STV
and 1st LTS test vehicles. Key elements of the Crew module include Structures
& Mechanisms, Thermal Protection, Avionics, Flight Software, Environmental
Control & Ufe Support System (ECLSS), and Launch Escape System. The
initial crew module must go through a qualification process following assembly,
integration, and test.
LTV Final Assembly- Identifies the schedule required to accomplish final
assembly of all elements previously discussed for each STV test vehicle. This
includes System Qualification and Pathfinder activities for the first STV and LTS
vehicles. A Flight Processing activity is also scheduled prior to each flight to
allow for final integration testing, checkout and launch Pad preparation.
3.4.2 Technology and Advanced Development Program
The Space Transfer Vehicle program provides both an opportunity and a
requirement to increase our upper stage capabilities with the development and
application of new technologies. Issues such as man rating, space basing,
reusability, and long lunar surface storage times drive the need for new
technology developments and applications. In addition, satisfaction of mission
requirements such as lunar cargo delivery capability and lunar landing either
require new technology development or can be achieved in a more cost-
effective manner with judicious applications of advanced technology.
During the STV study, advanced technology development requirements and
plans have been addressed by the Technology Advanced Development
Working Group composed of NASA and contractor representatives. Figure
3.4.2-1 provides a list of the technology categories and Figure 3.4.2-2 shows
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ground-based options. Sections 4-1.0 and 4-2.0, Volume II cover the
technology assessments and schedules for the STV program.
Main Engine. The objectives of main engine technology development are to
develop deep throttling required for lunar landing, increase Isp and thus reduce
IMLEO requirements, support reusability and low maintenance requirements,
ensure compatibility with .long-duration space exposure, provide engine
instrumentation that supports vehicle health monitoring (VHM) requirements,
and maintain or improve the reliability of current systems.
Aerobrake (Aeroassist)
Cryogenic Primary & Auxilliary Propulsion
Vehicle Cryogenic Ruid Systems
Vehicle Avionics, Electrical Power & Software
1. I
2. ___CurrentSTV I
3. Study Analysis
5. Vehicle Structures, Cryogenic Tankage, & Auxiliary Equip.
6. Crew Modules & Systems (incl. Biconic Crew Module)
7. Evironmental Control & Life Support Systems (ECLSS)
8. Vehicle Fabrication, Assy., Servicing & Processing
9. Space Vehicle Orbit Launch & Mission Control
10. Vehicle Flight Operations (incl. Launch Escape Systems)
11. Artificial Gravity
12..-13. Advanced Propulsion Systems (Not adressed in S'IV Contract)
Figure 3.4.2-1. Technology Categories Listing
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Evironmental Control & Life Support Systems (ECLSS)
Vehicle Fabrication, Assy., Servicing & Processing
Space Vehicle Orbit Launch & Mission Control
Vehicle Flight Operations (incl. Launch Escape Systems)
Artificial Gravity
Advanced Propulsion Systems (Not adressed in STV Contract)
Figure 3.4.2-1. Technology Categories Listing
The current state of the art in upper stage class LOX/LH2 main engines is
represented by the latest upgrade in the RL10 engine family produced by Pratt
& Whitney. Upgrades to the current RL10 capabilities are both required to
satisfy S'IV mission requirements and reduce costs. Medium to deep throttling
capability is required to initially provide (at 100% thrust) enough thrust to reduce
gravity losses when leaving low Earth orbit (LEO) and then to hover, reduce
thrust, and accomplish the lunar landing (requiring throttling down to 20% (5:1)
of thrust). Deep throttling has been demonstrated but is not currently available
in off-the-shelf engines.
For the space-based STV, maintenance considerations must be addressed
because of the high costs of space-based maintenance. The preferred
approach to accomplishing main engine maintenance is to remove and replace
the engine as a line replaceable unit (LRU). This requires design and
verification of a simple interface/attachment method. Conceptual designs of a
carrier plate concept containing all propellant and electrical connections in one
interface have been identified. Advanced turbomachinery and seal
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technologies will improve system launch readiness and availability for both STV
and EFO systems.
Requirements for reusability, autonomy, and lunar surface stay times prior to
engine restart for Earth return driverequirements for engine reliability and
health monitoring capability: Additionally, the space-based concept requires
compatibility with long-term exposure to space environments. Under an STV
subcontract, Pratt & Whitney has identified RL10 health monitoring
instrumentation concepts that will need to be further refined and demonstrated
with highly reliable sensors and health monitoring architectures (e.g., dual
redundancy). Reusability also drives requirements for multiple restart
capability.
Isp increases can significantly reduce propellant requirements. Figure 3.4.2-3
shows ETO mass per mission as a function of Isp. A savings of 50 metric tons
per mission is provided by an Isp increase from 440 seconds to 481 seconds.
Increases in Isp at a given thrust can be accomplished by increasing the
ETO Mass vs. Engine isp
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Figure 3.4.2-3. ETO Mass Versus Engine lsp
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combustion chambeJ' pressure (Pc) to between 400 and 1,500 psi and adjusting
the area ratio accordingly. Increases in Pc will require advances in
turbomachinery seals and bearings and chamber materials.
Two options for meeting these requirements were identified. The first option is
an RL10 upgrade (the RL10B-2) with a maximum Isp of 470 seconds. The
second option is an all new engine development. The RL10 upgrade is limited
in terms of Pc increases and corresponding adjustments of the area ratio both
by turbomachinery limitations and engine envelope considerations.
Alternatively, development of a new engine is being investigated that will
potentially provide Isp's up to 481 seconds at Pc's up to 1,500 psi. The
difference in ETO mass required is approximately 12 metric tons more mass
required per mission for the lower (470 seconds) lsp engine. Throttling
capability, reliability, thrust level, engine restart, and other requirements for a
new engine are all being currently defined through the STV study contracts and
the engine workshop activity being conducted by LeRC.
Attitude Control. The objective in attitude control is to develop the
technology required for high-performance gaseous O2/H2 thrusters in the 25-
and 80-1b or in the 75-1b range that integrate well with the rest of the vehicle and
are instrumented to support VHM. Propellants for the attitude control system
(ACS) were not baselined, so there was first the question of propellant selection
and, secondly, the selection of the required hardware. O2/H2 was the
propellant selected for the s'rv ACS to be used with gaseous O2/H2 thrusters.
No gaseous O2/H2 thrusters are currently available. Work was initially started
on this type of thruster for the Space Station. Thrusters from Rocketdyne,
Aerojet, and Bell underwent substantial testing. Aerojet then had a follow-on
contract to work on a thruster designed specifically for an 8:1 mixture ratio. The
8:1 mixture ratio was desired so that the electrolysis products of water at the
Space Station could be used for propellants. Rocketdyne also had a follow-on
contract for further thruster work.
In summary, sufficient capability to develop the thrusters is available. No major
technical hurdles have been identified while the primary technology has been
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demonstrated. The thrusters will need to be developed for STV but there is a
substantial database on which to draw.
Development will also be required for the attitude control system propellant
accumulator. The accumulator will draw low-pressure propellant from common
main propulsion/ACS tankage for accumulation as a supercritical fluid, high
pressure in the ACS accumulator.
Cryogenic Fluid Systems. The objectives for cryogenic fluid systems
technology development is to support S'I"V mission requirements for long-
duration storage of cryogenic fluids (e.g., on the lunar surface), in-space
cryogenic fluid transfer, and make and break of cryogenic fluid connections
(multiple times for space-based concepts). Tank venting and propellant-level
gaging is also required. Additionally, a common fuel, common supply
equipment, redundant, integrated propulsion/reaction control system has great
potential to reduce operational complexity. Integration of the power system with
the integrated propulsion/reaction control system is a possible growth
candidate, but it was not baselined for the STV.
The state of the art in insulation systems is double aluminized Kapton blankets
with Dacron net spacers between the blankets, also known as multilayer
insulation (MLI). Use of foam and MLI insulation has been baselined for the
s'rv. In this concept, an isocyanurate foam is either sprayed on (sprayed on
foam insulation (SOFI)) or machined and attached to the cryogenic tanks with
MLi attached over the foam. Foam and MLI provides better insulation than
helium-purged MLI alone. Use of foam also allows a (less expensive and less
operationally complex) GN2 ground purge instead of a helium purge. This
combined concept provides good insulation on both the ground (Earth) and in
space.
The state of the art in propellant gaging used to determine the amount of
propellant in a tank is represented by either point sensors or capacitance
probes. Both of these require the vehicle to perform a settling bum to move the
propellant to one end of the tank. Several concepts for zero gravity propellant
gaging have been proposed and investigated to some level. Acoustic methods
have been examined but proved to be too sensitive to tank geometry.
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Nucleonic methods are where radioactive sources are mounted on one side of
the tank and sensors on the other side. The method proposed for the STV is the
pressure-volume-temperature (PVT) method. With this approach, a small piston
is used to rapidly perturb the tank internal volume. With the change in volume,
a corresponding change in tank internal pressure and temperature is
measured. These changes can be related to the internal density in the tank and
the remaining propellant mass can be determined. PVT systems are being
developed by Ball Aerospace for JSC.
The state of the art in cryogenic fluid connectors is represented by the STS
external tank umbilical connectors. These connectors are not designed for
multiple mate and demate operations required by the STV. New development
is required in this area.
Similarly, there is no state of the art in zero gravity cryogenic fluid transfer. The
current approach for the STV is to perform all required fluid transfers either
during main propulsion burns or during ACS burns, which may include settling
burns conducted for the primary purpose of aiding propellant transfer.
Experiments have been planned (e.g.; Coldsat) to support development in this
area.
_r,,,j _
The final major area in cryogenic fluid systems of interest for STV is tank
pressure control. The state of the art in this area is represented by the use of
settled venting to control pressure buildup. The approach baselined for the
STV is the thermodynamic vent system (TVS). With this concept, a quantity of
gas and liquid mixture is expanded to the point where primarily gas remains,
which is then vented. This expansion draws heat from the propellant remaining
in the tank and thus primarily gas is vented and at the same time heat is
removed from the tank. The TVS also provides for propellant mixing to reduce
temperature stratification. A TVS was developed for the Shuttle/Centaur
program and tested extensively on the ground. However, with the cancellation
of the program, the TVS was not tested in space.
In summary, several advances are required for cryogenic fluid systems. MLI
and foam combination insulation systems; PVT propellant gaging; reusable,
reliable cryogenic connectors; and TVS pressure control are all baselined for
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the STV and need development. In addition, zero gravity cryogenic fluid
transfer development would be applicable to the S'IV.
Aeroassist and Aeromaneuver. The ground-based S'IV concept requires
a reentry crew module and the space-based S'IV concept uses an aerobrake
for LEO capture. The objectives for technology development in the aeroassist
and aeromaneuver category is to provide advances in thermal protection
systems (TPS) both for heat protection requirements and for simplification of
operational requirements. Development is required in tile and supporting
structure materials, seals, and tile attachment methods. Thermal and stability
modeling will also be required to verify and validate both biconic and aerobrake
design parameters.
The shuttle represents the state of the art in TPS. Fibrous refractory composite
insulation (FRCI) tiles are used over aluminum structure for protection from
reentry heating, except for the wing leading edges, which are made from
advanced carbon-carbon. AFRSI (or Q felt), a flexible quilted quartz cloth, is
used in more benign regions.
A distinction must be made between different TPS approaches. Options include
both hot and cold structure approaches. In hot structures, the thermal and
aerodynamic loads are accommodated with the same structure. In the cold
structure approach, the structure that carries the aerodynamic loads is different
from the structure that carries the thermal loads. The shuttle uses a cold
structure approach (FRCI tiles for thermal loads over aluminum structure that
carries aerodynamic loads) except at the wing leading edges, which consist of
the hot structure using advanced carbon-carbon.
Figure 3.4.2-4 contains a summary list of the materials with possible
applicability for the STV. In general, ablators tend to be heavy, used in an
expendable mode that requires additional refurbishment, and many contain
organics that can outgas in space and pollute the local environment. Ablator
thickness and material can be selected to support higher maximum temperature
and heating loads than reusable tile materials but, based on the above
considerations, were considered only if tile materials with the required
capabilities were not available.
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Figure 3.4.2.4. TPS Materials Options Tree
Zirconia was selected because it will satisfy the requirements for STV except for
in the areas of the biconic nosecap. Options for use in this area include either
an easily replaced sacrificial nose abJator or active cooUng of the nosecap. One
method of active cooling is to use Zirconla ceramic with a higher porosity than
might be used elsewhere on the body and pump water through it to
transpiration cool the vehicle nose.
Again, there are many material options for the underlying structure. The most
commonly used material is aluminum as used on the shuttle. Aluminum
presents a thermal expansion mismatch with the available tile materials
requiring strain isolation pads between the structure and the tiles. Composite
materials offer an alternative.
The STV baselined a thermoset graphite polyimide (Gr/Pi) structure with a Gr/Pi
honeycomb core and Gr/Pi face sheets because of (1) surface temperature
properties, (2) the capability to tailor the thermal expansion characteristics, and
(3) the lightest weight.
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Mechanical attachment of the Zirconia TPS to the underlying STV structure is
desired to facilitate maintenance and refurbishment. Zirconia is a ceramic that
is processed and manufactured at a relatively low temperature (approximately
800°F.) A high-temperature metallic honeycomb (e.g., titanium) can be cast into
the back surface of the ceramic. Metallic face sheets with integral mechantcal
fasteners can then be attached to the metallic honeycomb and with these
fasteners, connected to the underlying structure.
Conceptual designs of high-temperature seals have been developed for the
NASP program. More work needs to be done in the areas of high-temperature
seals and sealants for spaces between tiles.
Avionics. Avionics is probably the area of most rapid technology
advancement. The objectives for avionics technology development are to
develop highly reliable, low maintenance avionics capable of safe, autonomous
operations and compatible with long duration space exposure. Reductions in
avionics power requirements and weight are also desired.
Ayionics Comoonents. In application specific integrated circuits, the state of the
art is very large integrated circuits. The baselined integrated circuits for the S'IV
are radiation-hardened and single-event upset (SEU) tolerant chips and wafers.
Radiation hardness requires special design, layout features, and materials.
SEU results in a memory state change from passage of galactic cosmic ray
particles (e.g., electrons, protons, and nuclei of all elements) or solar flare
(lower energy protons and alpha particles) through the memory cell.
Submicron CMOS/Silicon on sapphire (SOS) provides more radiation
resistance than silicon alone. With the long durations in space and on the lunar
surface, and subsequent extended exposure to radiation, SoS is seen as
providing a substantial benefit to the STV.
Traditional integrated circuits are produced by slicing a wafer of material off of a
cylinder of the material. The wafer is then usually cut into rectangles, circuits
are etched, and then the leads are attached. With the use of SoS wafer scale
integration, the full wafer itself is used and these wafers can then be stacked
like pancakes. This will allow what once were several boards to be combined
on one wafer, again with the resulting increases in reliability due to the
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reduction in outside connections. Processing density is increased and
packaging is made much simpler, reducing volume requirements and
enhancing maintenance, not to mention performance ranges of mini-
supercomputers in a "tuna can."
Fiber-optic sensors in conjunction with sensor networks show promise in
reducing cost and weight and increasing reliability. Fiber-optic sensors are
impervious to electrostatic discharge problems and also enhance safety by
reducing electrical components in the vicinity of hazardous fluids.
A promising area is the development of neural networks that, with input data
from multiple sensors, can generate an output signature for specific flight
elements or for the entire vehicle. For example, multiple temperature
measurements across a tank can be combined within a neural network with the
output consisting of a tank signature, such as OK or not OK, localized hot spot,
or localized cold spot. Neural networks also show promise in the area of fault
tolerance with the large number of processing sites and interconnectivity
making a failure in any individual neural site relatively unimportant. Neural
networks show promise as a component in the VHMS and in support of vehicle
autonomy.
Navigation instrument advances have been baselined for the STV. The state of
the art in gyros is represented by ring laser gyros (RLG). RLGs have flown on
Boeing 757 and 767 commercial airplanes and have been used in space
applications for the Ariane 4. RLGs use a single laser light source that sends
laser beams in opposite directions around either a triad or rectangle of mirrors.
A rotation of the RLG in the measured axis respectively lengthens and shortens
the distance that the beams sent in opposite directions travel. This then creates
a phase difference between the two beams of light that is measured and related
to the rotation.
Fiber-optic gyros (FOG) work on somewhat the same principle as RLGs;
however, a winding, (= 400m) of fiber-optic cable is used for the light path
instead of the mirror system. Dithering mechanisms, mirrors, and path length
controllers are not required, as on the RLGs, thus reducing weight and, with
fewer parts, increasing reliability. Also with the reduction in electrical parts,
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susceptibility to radiation induced SEUs is greatly reduced. The STV has
baselined RLGs in a six RLG, six accelerometer skewed axis hexad inertial
measurement unit; however, FOGs will be maintained as an option.
"Fhe state of the art in radar used for rendezvous and docking and potentially
landing is the range/range rate Doppler radar used by the shuttle. STV will also
use Doppler radar. Space-based Doppler radar as used in the shuttle is still
fairly crude and will require further development. Advanced radar systems use
a phased array of sensors place about the vehicle. By sensing the phase
difference among the multiple sensors, angle, range, and rates are resolved.
This eliminates the need for a bulky pedestal-mounted motor-driven dish. The
STV may also include side-looking aperture radar (SLAR). SLAR is used on
the Magellan spacecraft to map the surface of Venus. With multiple lunar orbit
passes the SLAR can build a map of the lunar surface terrain height features to
support landing decisions.
p,vioqics Networks. Sensor networks include fiber-optic sensors, smart
sensors, analog multiplexing techniques, digital multiplexing techniques,
network components (wire/fiber media and connectors), and network interface
units. Benefits of using a sensor network of fiber-optic sensors or multisensors
includes the reduction of weight and increases in reliability associated with
reductions in the number of point-to-point wirings commonly used in current
connection approaches. In addition, fiber-optic sensors can enhance safety
when used to sense propellant levels without using electrical components
within the tank.
Also of interest for STV are higher speed digital data buses. Data buses again
reduce point-to-point wiring and the associated reliability and weight concerns.
To support the concept of modular avionics, which allows technology changes,
upgrades, and growth add-ons, the embedded networks must have high
channel capacity and be very robust and damage tolerant. A zero-downtime
network will support long-duration missions with multiple sorties without
maintenance. Fiber-optic digital data distribution networks (100 to 1,000 MIPs,
multiple wavelength, active redundant) with separation of flight critical data from
non-flight critical data are baselined,
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_.._J A third area of importance is the standardization of digital interfaces.
Standardized interfaces support common test interface equipment and
generally lower costs. In-space assembly or mate/demate/remate of flight
elements is facilitated by standard interconnection systems.
Avionics Subsystem Areas. STV autonomy requirements and long durations
spent in space will require a vehicle health management system (VHMS). VHM
provides better vehicle availability and lower costs through automated launch
processing. The operational status of the vehicle can be determined through all
mission phases based on previous operating performance and built-in tests
(BIT). VHM also supports maintenance with fault isolation.
The VHMS is essentially distributed throughout the entire vehicle. VHMS
consists primarily of sensing and monitoring functions and management
functions. Sensing is primarily the domain of the avionics subsystem with
monitoring being either a hardware or software area. The management
functions can be software-based mission management rules, as well as
hardware based such as hardware-driven reconfiguration. VHMS is a concern
of software, the entire avionics architecture, and individual avionics
components. LeRC has conducted some workshop activity with the intention of
supporting an initiative in this area.
The state of the art in fault tolerant systems is represented by the shuttle. The
shuttle uses a combination of hardware and software for fault tolerance in the
flight critical subsystems. For example, four computers with software voting are
all active. Failed computers are identified to the flight crew deck and may be
taken offline. The STV has baselined a primarily photonic avionics system
using common avionics modules providing hardware voting. Application
programmers will not need to provide software for the voting.
Finally in the area of communication and tracking, the STV has baselined a
radio/laser communication systems. Laser provides radiation-tolerant, high-
speed secure communications and will be used for vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-
to-ground communications. Laser will also be used for docking. The state of
the art in laser communications is Navy ship-to-ship antijam, secure links.
Radio communication data rates have been steadily increasing due to
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electronics technology and data encoding schemes that increase the link
margin between terminals. Adaptive communications provide a robust link in
the presence of solar activity.
The state of the art in communications support satellite systems is represented
by the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS). TDRSS has the
capability to handle communications in the 300-Mbps range; however,
subtracting the communications overhead leaves an approximate 180-Mbps
data rate available for sending information. Availability of TDRSS is also a
concern. Advanced TDRSS (ATDRSS) will be able to support a much higher
data rate, which STV will use to support color video, high amounts of scientific
data transmittal, and so forth.
_. Software is characterized by the avionics. The primary new
technology objective in software development is to develop adaptive guidance,
navigation, and control (GN&C) algorithms with appropriate validation and
verification methods. Adaptive GN&C also needs to be integrated with the
appropriate sensor networks.
The state of the art in software is that used in the shuttle software and avionics
design. The shuttle used the HAWS software language, a language developed
for, and used only on, the shuttle. Some manned Earth aircraft have been built
for the DoD agencies that incorporate new GN&C software, but these systems
are classified or not man rated for space.
STV will be using the Ada language. Ada provides an Ada task scheduler,
which is essentially a part of the executive program. The individual user must
provide the additional executive functions required for the specific application.
Ada is expected to reduce software maintenance requirements and provide
commonality across development programs. Selected development and
prototyping of the software is planned to reduce program risk.
Power. Objectives for power technology development are to support
lightweight, reliable, power equipment development that integrates well with the
vehicle, supports the total and peak loading requirements, and is instrumented
to support VHM. The STV power subsystem baseline consists of fuel cells with
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lithium thionyl chloride (LiSOCI2) batteries for handling peak loads required by
the thrust vector control (TVC) system. With this approach, the fuel cells do not
need to be sized for the high TVC load levels required over an extremely small
portion of tl_e mission.
The state of the art in space-qualified batteries are the silver zinc (AgZn)
batteries used on the IUS (and the shuttle). Currently in development by SAFT
of France for Centaur is a 250 amp-hour LiSOCI2 battery. Planned for
qualification in December 1991, the USOCI2 battery features an energy density
of approximately 242 watt-hour/kg, which is almost twice that of the AgZn
batteries with the resulting reduction in weight for the required power.
Fuel cells use an electrochemical reaction to produce power. Gaseous 02 and
H2 come into contact with their respective electrodes and combine, producing
power and, as a byproduct, potable water. The state of the art in fuel cells is
represented by the shuttle fuel cells made by International Fuel Cells, a
subsidiary of United Technologies. No technology development in the area of
fuel cells is required for the power system baselined for the STV.
Crew Module Systems. Crew module designs need to be directed at special
crew safety and comfort requirements of a deep space transportation vehicle.
Crew modules must comply with NASA STD 3000 requirements. Additionally,
crew module reuse will impose operational refurbishment requirements such as
easy access and replacement. Effective radiation protection, high-reliability
environmental control, fault tolerant backup systems, easily maintainable life
support system elements, appropriate abort and emergency equipment, and
sealed redundant control capability are required.
The state of the art in environmental control and life support systems (ECLSS)
is represented by the shuttle. A cabin atmosphere of 79% nitrogen and 21%
oxygen is maintained at 14.7 psi. The atmosphere is supplied by a redundant
O2/N2 supply system and an additional 02 emergency supply system is
provided. Atmospheric revitalization is accomplished by using fans to circulate
the air through lithium hydroxide and activated charcoal filters. Trace
contaminant control is accomplished with an ambient temperature catalytic
oxidizer that primarily serves to remove any CO in the air.
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Thermal control of the cabin is accomplished with a series of pipes and heat
exchangers using water as the active fluid. Byproduct water (75 kg) from the
fuel cells is stored in a tank and pumped through the supply/heat exchanger
system. This water is then passed through a mid-fuselage water/Freon 21 heat
exchanger and the excess heat is radiated to space through the Freon 21
radiators located in the cargo bay doors.
For fire detection and suppression, the shuttle uses ionization detectors located
in each of the three avionics bays to sense combustion byproducts. Fire
suppression is accomplished by means of both manual and switch activated fire
extinguishers.
The state of the art in crew controls and displays is represented by
reconfigurable liquid crystal displays (LCD). The LCDs can display graphical or
numerical data and are driven by separate controllers for redundancy. The
displays and pushbuttons are reconfigurable and would assist in reducing
information overload by presenting only data applicable to the current flight
phase. This technology requires low power and is state of the art in current
military and commercial systems.
Primary areas requiring development for the STV are in the crew controls and
displays and in development of a new, lightweight, reliable commode.
Structures. Tankaoe. and Auxiliary Eouioment. Current structural technologies
are based on the shuttle and advanced military airplane structures that are
proprietary or classified. Development of structural materials and methods will
be required for the STV. The STV will use aluminum-lithium (AI-Li) tankage
with composite interstages. AI-U provides a lighter, stronger tank structure.
Development and verification of AI-Li welding processes is required and is
being conducted for the HLLV program.
Auxiliary equipment such as disconnects and advanced materials fasteners are
required. The aerobrake requires large hinges for packaging in the HLLV
payload shroud and will need reliable hinges and deploy mechanisms.
Cryogenic, electrical, and structural disconnects are required for tank staging
and GB/GO concept vehicle staging of landing legs and engines.
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A launch escape system (LES) is required for the GB/GO option. This system
will act to pull (or push) the crew and crew module away from the launch vehicle
in the event of a booster failure. LES development will be required for a system
that integrates with both the STV and the booster and provides escape for the
crew in time and within acceleration limits. Sensing of imminent booster failure
will be required for activation of the LES.
3.5 COST (1989 DOLLARS)
Executive Summary of Cost Estimates. The STV program is developed
to capture both lunar transportation system (LTS) and other CNDB missions.
The program life cycle costs are estimated separately for the LTS missions
(lunar trips with additional space tug missions for SEI).
The other CNDB missions are proposed to be captured using a small stage
derivative of the LTS flight hardware. A summary of the three LTS configuration
life cycle cost estimates is presented in Figure 3.5-1. Further details of the
summary life cycle cost data are available for review in Volume III, Book 1 of the
Boeing final report.
The final three Boeing LTS candidate configurations are presented as a
comparison set. Each final 1.5-stage configuration candidate has merits for the
final selection. The final configuration choice will be dependent on the
outcomes of national space program decisions concerning the Space Station
Freedom (SSF) and Heavy Lift Launch System (sometimes referred to as the
National Launch System) projects.
Each LTS configuration requires a unique space or ground infrastructure
systems support to operate. The life cycle cost estimates in Figure 3.5-1
assume that the Space Station and/or launch system elements already exist by
the first LTS mission.
The additional costs to upgrade the Space Station (low earth orbit node) and an
advanced launch vehicle system (ETO) are included in each of the the LCC
estimates. The low Earth orbit (LEO) node and ETO modification estimates are
based on current Advanced Launch System LCC model data and cost
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7.1 NASA Mgmt. 1.405 1.584
7.2.1 Prog. Mgmt. 9.556 11.541
7.2.2 System Engr. 0.310 0.203
7.2.3 Flight 19.163 23.454
Hardware
7.2.4 Support 0.403 0.348
Equip.
7.2.5 Payload (TBD) (TBD)
Accom.
7.2.6 Software (Fit) 1.500 1.875
7.2.7 System Test .882 .508
Op.
7.2.8 Ground Ops..586 .358
N/R
7.2.9 Mission Ops..296 .296
N/R
7.3 LTS O&S 5.171 8.600
(Veh.)
3.0 ETO (HLLV) 52.434 28.053
4.0 LEO Node 6.674 0
(SSF)
Total LCC-
Figure 3.5-1.
1.451
10.157
0.179
20.319
0.308
(TBD)
1.775
.473
.358
.296
8.348
23.447
o
Project Total $ 98.380 B $ 76.820 B
(1991 dollars in billions)
Lunar Transportation System LCC Estimates
$67.111 B
estimates from the Boeing Advanced Civil Space Systems group and General
Dynamics Infrastructure studies (being conducted for NASA-MSFC).
Final ETO cost estimates were developed using dollars per pound factors
provided by the NASA program office. For smaller HLLV launch booster system
flights delivering approximately 71 metric tons costs are estimated at $2,500/1b
of LTS payload. For large HLLVs, with 125 to 250 metric ton payload capability,
ETO cost is estimated using an average recurring flight cost factor of $1,300/Ib
of LTS payload
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LTS Development Estimates Summary. A development estimate for
each Boeing LTS candidate configuration (including small stage derivative
development) was created using a Boeing proprietary parametric cost model.
Each estimate is time spread to the program development schedule shown in
Figure 3.5-2. The DDT&E estimates include phase B and phase C/D program
costs.
The time spread expenditures profiles for each Boeing LTS configuration
development program is contained in Figures 3.5-3 through 3.5-5. In each
case, the estimated peak expenditure for development funding does not exceed
$4.5 billion (in constant-year, 1991 dollars).
LTS Development Estimates Comparison With Apollo. As a
reasonableness check, a comparison profile of Apollo program development
costs (in 1991 dollars) with the Boeing LTS candidates is presented in Figure
3.5-6. The comparison excludes prior Apollo engines and advanced space
engines development for the new project cost estimate distributions.
Thecomparison shows that the Apollo command and service module, lunar
module, and Saturn IV-B stage development costs, in 1991 dollars using NASA
source data and escalation tables, were much higher. The higher Apollo costs
are a result of a shorter development schedule (7 years) and a smaller
technology experience base (first time development with less in-space and
lunar surface environment experience).
LTS Development Cost Risk Analysis Summary. A cost uncertainty
analysis is also required to provide a cost risk evaluation of the Boeing
parametric cost estimates for LTS program development. Figure 3.5-7 data
show that in all cases the estimated development costs still fall below the Apollo
historical cost experience total and peak funding in equivalent year (1991
dollars).
All estimates are developed with top-level NASA planning information and
contractor interpretation of the 90-day study requirements. The mission need
requirement for a future STV lunar transportation system with a large 34 metric
ton payload capability also drives the Boeing development and life cycle cost
estimates.
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GROUND-ORBITAL
CORE
CREW MODULE
TLi TANKS
TANKER
|
m
AEROBRAKE !
CREW MODULE
TLI TANKS
LUNAR DESCENT
TANKS
(1991 Dollars in Millions
DDT&E
Hardware
Low
($20,759 Total)
3896.59
2579.61
390.08
921.32
o
3221.73
2143.31
323.28
756.91
5O/5O
4027.92
2662.98
402.95
952.23
4846.45
3196.46
484.23
1148.88
($24,594 Total)
1987.65
4303.70
390.08
680.19
1655.08
3558.59
323.28
564.89
2051.49
4514.20
402.95
702.86
2459.81
5366.02
484.23
843.93
NOTE:
" PROGRAM ESTIMATE EXCLUDES SCHEDULE PENALTY
° PARAMETRIC COST MODEL OUTPUT EXCLUDES ADVANCED SPACE
ENGINE AND NASA PROGRAM LEVEL FACTORS (REQUIREMENTS
CONTINGENCY, FEE, NASA PROGRAM SUPPORT)
Figure 3.5-7. Ranger Cost Risk Analysis by LTS Flight Element
(Before Factors Application)
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